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ANTITRUST REGULATION AND THE 
FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE: RESTORING 
THE ORIGINAL DESIGN 
ALAN J. MEESE* 
The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the 
national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act (“the Act”) reflects this 
allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are “in 
restraint of . . . commerce among the several States.” This Article contends that 
the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and 
national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of 
precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints. 
This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute’s apparent meaning, 
unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the 
regime of competitive federalism that had governed most intrastate restraints. 
Drawing from its Commerce Clause jurisprudence of dual federalism, the Court 
initially employed the direct/indirect standard to allocate regulatory authority over 
intrastate restraints. Effects were direct if a restraint exercised market power to injure 
out-of-state consumers. The Sherman Act exerted Congress’s exclusive authority over 
such restraints, because state regulation might produce self-interested results contrary 
to the anti-favoritism principle that animated Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
States retained exclusive authority over agreements producing indirect impacts on 
interstate commerce, and a regime of competitive federalism generated the rules 
governing such restraints. Because states internalized the full impact of such 
                                               
* Ball Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for the Study of Law and Markets, 
William and Mary Law School. The author wishes to thank Allison Orr Larson for 
valuable conversations about this project as well as the participants in a faculty 
workshop at the William and Mary Law School for their helpful comments. Both the 
William and Mary Law School and the Center for the Study of Law and Markets provided 
financial support for this article. Thanks also to the editors of the American University 
Law Review for their thoughtful edits and diligent efforts. 
 
76 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:75 
 
restraints, interjurisdictional competition likely tended to produce optimal legal 
rules. 
Echoing Wickard v. Filburn, the Court jettisoned the direct/indirect standard 
in 1948, holding that the Act reaches restraints producing a “substantial effect”—
even if harmless and indirect—on interstate commerce. This vast expansion of the 
Act undermined the regime of competitive federalism that had governed most 
intrastate restraints. This change also enabled application of the statute to local, 
state-approved restraints, empowering antitrust courts to supervise state regulatory 
processes, further undermining competitive federalism. 
The Court has offered three rationales for rejecting the direct/indirect 
standard. First, the Court has claimed that Congress meant to reach restraints 
beyond the authority implied by pre-1890 dual federalism jurisprudence. Second, 
the Court has contended that the Act properly expands whenever the commerce 
power expands in other contexts. Third, the Court has treated the substantial 
effects test as a translation of the Act justified by a changed national economy. 
The Court has invoked the Act’s legislative history to bolster the first two 
contentions. 
None of these rationales survives scrutiny. First, the phrase “restraint of . . . 
commerce among the several States” was apparently a term of art drawn from 
pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence. That case law employed “restraint” 
of interstate commerce as a synonym for state “regulation” of such commerce 
deemed invalid because it directly burdened interstate commerce. Given the prior 
construction canon, Congress’s invocation of “restraint of . . . commerce” suggests 
that the Act should condemn only those private agreements that “directly burden” 
interstate commerce. The Court read the Act exactly this way in the 1890s, 
repeatedly holding that agreements only restrained interstate commerce if they 
imposed direct burdens by producing supracompetitive prices for interstate 
transactions. These near-contemporaneous readings, themselves probative of 
original meaning, avoided constitutional difficulties that would have resulted 
from application of the Act to restraints causing no interstate harm. 
Second, assertions that Congress chose to exercise whatever power future Courts 
might grant are speculation. Congress has declined to exercise its entire commerce 
power when enacting three different post-1890 antitrust statutes. Engrafting the 
substantial effects test onto the Sherman Act contravened the federal-state balance 
canon by supplanting traditional state prerogatives over restraints threatening no 
interstate harm. 
Third, the substantial effects test is not a faithful translation of the Sherman 
Act. No court or scholar has identified changed circumstances that justify such 
a translation. Neither integration of the national economy nor increased scale 
of enterprises suggests that such restraints generally produce interstate harm or 
that states are incapable of regulating them. 
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The legislative history actually bolsters this textual analysis. Several Senators 
endorsed pre-1890 dual federalism jurisprudence. The Senate Judiciary Committee 
rewrote Sherman’s bill, employing the term “restraint of commerce” to narrow its 
reach. The House passed the Senate bill verbatim, after its Judiciary Committee also 
embraced dual federalism. No member of Congress suggested that the Act would 
expand if the Court subsequently enlarged the scope of the commerce power. 
The conclusion that the Court erred in 1948 does not itself justify return to 
the pre-1948 allocation of authority over antitrust matters. While stare decisis 
is weaker in the antitrust context, mere legal error does not suffice to upset 
longstanding precedent. If, however, the Court attributes the 1948 revision and 
continued expansion of the Act to changed economic circumstances—such as 
increased integration of the national economy—stare decisis should yield to post-
1948 developments in the theory of competitive federalism. These developments 
confirmed that states possess appropriate incentives to generate impartial rules 
with respect to restraints that produce no interstate harm. 
Reviving the direct/indirect standard would reboot competitive federalism in 
antitrust. The resulting competition between state “laboratories of democracy” 
would generate various substantive and institutional solutions to antitrust 
problems, as states vie for producers and consumers by offering rival packages of 
antitrust doctrine and enforcement institutions. Restoring the pre-1948 regime 
would also radically shrink the category of state-approved restraints potentially 
subject to the Act. Moreover, cases involving such restraints that did reach the 
Court would look quite different from those that have informed the Court’s 
treatment of these restraints. Instead of state regulation of local billboards and 
the like, such cases would involve restraints imposing substantial harm on out-
of-state consumers. This new framing could force the current Court, which has 
less faith in regulation than its predecessors, to reconsider its approach to state-
approved restraints. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress limited regulatory powers, 
leaving the remaining authority to the states. Passed in 1890, the 
Sherman Antitrust Act1 (“the Sherman Act” or “the Act”) reflects this 
allocation of responsibility, reaching only a subset of trade restraints, 
while states retain authority over the rest. This Article contends that the 
Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state 
and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abandoning several 
decades of precedent that recognized exclusive state authority over most 
intrastate restraints. This change contravened the apparent intent of 
Congress, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and 
undermined the regime of competitive federalism that had generated the 
rules governing intrastate restraints producing no interstate harm. 
The Sherman Act reaches only those restraints of trade that also restrain 
“commerce among the several States.”2 The Supreme Court initially read 
this language to place meaningful limits on the scope of the Act. Drawing 
upon its Commerce Clause jurisprudence of dual federalism, the Court 
held that the Act usually did not reach intrastate restraints—that is, 
agreements governing transactions or transportation confined to one 
state. Intrastate cartels and mergers thus fell within the exclusive 
                                               
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018). 
 2. Id. § 1. 
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jurisdiction of individual states, even if such restraints indirectly 
affected interstate commerce. 
There was an important caveat, however. When intrastate restraints 
affected interstate commerce “directly,” the Sherman Act reached such 
agreements to the exclusion of the states. Effects were direct if the 
restraint produced antitrust harm that crossed state lines, by exercising 
market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers. For more 
than five decades, the Act reached only those restraints that produced 
interstate harm, leaving states with exclusive authority over all other 
restraints within their respective borders. Authority over trade 
restraints thus resided in mutually exclusive domains, and a regime of 
competitive federalism produced the rules governing those restraints 
within the exclusive authority of the states. 
The Court abruptly changed course in 1948, greatly expanding the Act’s 
reach and adjusting the boundaries between state and federal authority in 
favor of the federal government. Echoing Wickard v. Filburn,3 the Court 
replaced the direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test.4 
Thus, the Sherman Act now reaches local restraints producing no interstate 
harm. 
The resulting fundamental change left states and the national 
government with concurrent authority over most of the nation’s trade 
restraints, subjecting parties to regulation by two sovereigns. While 
mainly directed at private restraints, this vast expansion of the Act also 
resulted in possible application of the statute to numerous state-
approved restraints that previously exceeded the statute’s reach. 
Although the Court initially held that state-approved restraints are 
immune from the Act under the so-called “state action” doctrine, it 
subsequently conditioned this immunity on the satisfaction of certain 
procedural requirements. As a result, adoption of the substantial 
effects test rendered the statute a vehicle for second-guessing local 
regulatory decisions and the process employed to reach them. The new 
regime also raised the specter of Sherman Act preemption of state 
antitrust laws. Finally, the change undermined the role of competitive 
federalism in generating legal rules to govern local restraints that 
produced no interstate harm. 
Reinterpretation of an unchanged statute requires some explanation. 
The Court has offered three distinct rationales for replacing the 
direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test. First, the Court 
                                               
 3. 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942). 
 4. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948). 
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has claimed that the 1890 Congress did not share the 1890 Court’s 
commitment to dual federalism and related belief that authority over 
trade restraints was mutually exclusive. Instead, it has said that Congress 
meant to reach local restraints that substantially but indirectly impact 
interstate commerce, without displacing concurrent state authority 
over such agreements. Second, the Court has claimed that Congress 
meant to exercise its entire commerce power, including any additional 
authority obtained when the commerce power expands outside the 
antitrust context, as it did when Wickard announced a novel standard 
expanding the scope of Congress’s authority. Third, the Court has 
claimed that changed economic circumstances, including increased 
integration of the national economy and growth in the size of business 
enterprises, justified revising application of the Act to reach local 
restraints that substantially impact interstate commerce. Put another 
way, the 1948 revision translated the underlying principle informing 
the scope of the Act in light of new information and thus faithfully 
applied Congress’s normative choices. 
Each of these arguments rests upon express or implied assertions 
about the original meaning of the Sherman Act. This Article examines 
the meaning of the phrase “restraint of . . . commerce among the 
several States” and thus evaluates the Court’s three rationales for 
replacing the direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test. 
This examination concludes that the substantial effects test does not 
faithfully implement the original meaning of the Act. 
All the available evidence of original statutory meaning rebuts the 
first rationale and confirms that the Sherman Act incorporates the 
direct/indirect standard to define the boundary between state and 
national authority over trade restraints. The Congress that wrote the 
Act did so against the background of a highly developed Supreme Court 
jurisprudence defining the scope of the commerce power and allocating 
regulatory authority between states and the national government. This 
jurisprudence read the Commerce Clause as implementing an anti-
favoritism principle, empowering Congress to preempt state legislation 
that enriched one state’s citizens at the expense of others. 
While Congress rarely exercised this power by enacting legislation, 
the Court created a quasi-statutory regime under which congressional 
silence regarding “inherently national” subjects signaled Congress’s will to 
preempt state laws regulating such activities. State legislation regulated 
these subjects, in turn, if it produced direct impacts on interstate 
commerce. Laws affecting interstate commerce only indirectly exceeded 
the scope of Congress’s power and thus could not interfere with any 
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exclusive national authority. Reading the Sherman Act to reach local 
restraints that substantially but only indirectly affect interstate 
commerce would exceed the scope of the commerce power articulated 
in this pre-1890 jurisprudence and contravene the avoidance canon, 
which requires courts to read statutes so as not to exceed judicially-
imposed constitutional limitations. 
The avoidance canon offers no affirmative account of statutory meaning. 
The prior construction canon does, however. The quasi-statutory regime 
described above produced terms of art that illuminated the meaning of the 
Act. Major cases during the 1880s referred to state laws that “directly 
burdened” and thus regulated interstate commerce as “restraints” of that 
commerce, treating the terms “regulate” and “restrain” as synonymous. 
The Congress that passed the Sherman Act was presumably aware of 
these decisions. Thus, the Act’s invocation of “restraint of . . . commerce 
among the several States,” suggested that the Act would perform the same 
role vis-á-vis private agreements that Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
played with respect to state legislation. Congress “presumably kn[ew] and 
adopt[ed] the cluster of ideas that were attached” to this term of art, 
including the direct/indirect standard employed when evaluating 
challenges to state legislation.5 This realization suggests that the Act 
condemns only those “restraints of trade” that also “directly obstruct” or 
“directly burden” interstate commerce. Following this logic, the Act left 
agreements that caused no such effects unscathed, even if they otherwise 
restrain (intrastate) trade and produce substantial effects on interstate 
commerce. 
The Supreme Court read the Act in exactly this manner during the 
1890s. In five unanimous or near unanimous decisions, the Court 
construed the Act to ban only those restraints of trade that impacted 
interstate commerce “directly.” Agreements affecting interstate commerce 
“indirectly”—even if they otherwise restrained trade and produced 
substantial intrastate harm—exceeded the scope of the Act. Congress 
banned agreements that directly impacted interstate commerce, the 
Court said, because they may impose the same harmful impact on such 
commerce as analogous state laws preempted by Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. Intrastate restraints produced a “direct” impact on 
interstate commerce if they exercised market power to the detriment 
of consumers in other states. 
The Court also offered a functional rationale for its definition of 
“restraint of commerce” and resulting allocation of authority between 
                                               
 5. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). 
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states and the national government. Drawing upon the anti-favoritism 
principle that animated its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court 
observed that allowing states to regulate agreements that directly 
impacted interstate commerce would result in conflicting legislation 
reflecting each state’s “particular interest.”6 Thus, the Court read the Act 
to reach only those restraints that threatened interstate harm and thereby 
tempted states to adopt rules governing such agreements that favored 
their own citizens at the expense of others. These contemporaneous 
constructions, which replicated the meaning suggested by the prior 
construction canon, are important evidence of the statute’s original 
meaning and bolster the conclusion that the Act does not reach intrastate 
agreements producing substantial but indirect effects on interstate 
commerce. 
The second rationale for the substantial effects test—that Congress 
meant the Sherman Act to expand with the commerce power—fares no 
better. To be sure, changed circumstances could result in revised 
applications of an unchanged direct/indirect standard, thereby altering 
the practical boundary between state and national authority and 
effectuating the intent of Congress to reach conduct that produces 
particular effects. But the substantial effects test is an entirely new standard 
unknown to the 1890 Congress, a standard that reflects different normative 
choices about the proper allocation of regulatory authority in the federal 
system. The Court has nonetheless claimed that Congress meant the 
scope of the Sherman Act to expand accordingly, reaching conduct that 
produces only indirect, but substantial, effects on interstate commerce.  
However, the empirical basis for this claim is questionable, to say the 
least. Congress has often refused to exercise the full extent of its 
commerce power, leaving regulation of interstate commercial subjects 
to the states. Indeed, Congress has declined three different times to 
exercise its entire commerce power when enacting post-1890 antitrust 
legislation. It thus seems altogether possible that the 1890 Congress 
would not have exercised more expansive authority than conferred by 
the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence if given the 
opportunity to do so. Nothing in the Act’s text speaks to how the 1890 
Congress would have (re)drafted the Act in response to the sort of 
fundamental constitutional change that Wickard wrought. 
The federal-state balance canon resolves this dilemma. Since the early 
1940s, the Supreme Court has refused to read ambiguous federal statutes 
to reach conduct traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation. More 
                                               
 6. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231–32 (1899). 
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recently, the Court has recognized that trade restraints are topics 
“traditionally regulated by the States.”7 Replacing the direct/indirect 
standard with the substantial effects test contravened this canon by 
expanding an ambiguous Sherman Act to supplant traditional state 
prerogatives. 
The statutory analysis that compels rejection of the first two rationales 
for the substantial effects test also facilitates evaluation of the final claim, 
i.e., that the test is a valid translation of the underlying principle 
informing the scope of the Act. By enacting the phrase “restraint of . . . 
commerce among the several States,” Congress apparently embraced 
the anti-favoritism principle animating the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. Under this approach, intrastate agreements ran 
afoul of the Sherman Act if they produced harm exceeding the 
boundaries of a single state, with the result that state regulation of such 
activity would produce self-interested results. 
The substantial effects test is not a faithful translation of this principle. 
No proponent of the test has identified any changed circumstances 
suggesting that agreements inducing substantial but indirect impacts on 
interstate commerce generally produce interstate harm. The nation’s 
economy is certainly more integrated than in 1890, enterprises have 
achieved greater scale, and more agreements impact interstate commerce. 
However, proof that more restraints produce effects—direct or indirect—
on interstate commerce does not imply that the direct/indirect standard is 
somehow an inadequate method for ascertaining whether the Sherman Act 
reaches a particular restraint or that states lack proper incentives to 
police such restraints. Instead of translating the Sherman Act in a new 
context, the substantial effects test implements an entirely new 
principle, contradicting Congress’s normative choices. 
This Article primarily employs conventional techniques of statutory 
interpretation—namely, the text and relevant canons of construction 
that shed light on that text’s plain meaning to those who drafted it. But 
the Court has also invoked a few sentences from the Act’s legislative 
history in support of the substantial effects test. Proponents of the 
substantial effects test may contend that such history constitutes the 
sort of clear statement that overrides the federal-state balance canon, 
for instance. However, this Article examines the Act’s legislative history 
and concludes that such history actually bolsters the result of this 
Article’s textual analysis. 
                                               
 7. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 & n.4 (1989). 
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The legislative history reveals that key members of Congress fully 
understood the Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence and aimed to 
implement it. To be sure, some applications of bills Senator Sherman 
introduced would have exceeded the scope of the commerce power 
defined by the Court’s precedents. However, several Senators who 
embraced the Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence, including 
mutually exclusive authority over trade restraints, opposed Sherman’s 
proposals. Over Sherman’s objection, the Senate directed its Judiciary 
Committee to redraft Sherman’s bill, narrowing its reach and producing 
what became the Sherman Act. The actual author of the statute’s 
language, Senator George Edmunds, had opined that Congress lacked 
authority to ban formation of the sugar trust, presaging the Court’s 1895 
holding to this effect in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.8 
The House Judiciary Committee report on the Senate measure 
embraced dual federalism and mutually exclusive authority over trade 
restraints. The Committee endorsed the bill as “carefully confined to 
such subjects of legislation as are clearly within the legislative authority 
of Congress.”9 The Committee also observed that “[n]o attempt is 
made to invade the legislative authority of the several States or even to 
occupy doubtful grounds.”10 
No member of Congress suggested that the reach of the Act would 
expand if the Court created a novel standard governing the scope of the 
commerce power. Indeed, one Senator whose remarks the Supreme 
Court has selectively invoked characterized the commerce power as 
quite narrow, opining that the Act would leave most trusts unscathed. 
Assertions that Congress meant the Act to expand along with entirely 
revised conceptions of the commerce power are speculation with no 
support in the legislative history. 
The conclusion that the substantial effects test is an erroneous 
interpretation of the Sherman Act does not itself justify return to the pre-
1948 allocation of authority over antitrust matters. While stare decisis has 
a relatively weak claim in the antitrust context, mere legal error does not 
suffice to upset longstanding precedent. If, on the other hand, the 
Court attributes the 1948 revision and continued expansion of the Act to 
changed economic circumstances—such as increased integration of the 
national economy—stare decisis should yield to post-1948 developments 
in the theory of competitive federalism. These developments confirm 
                                               
 8. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 51-1707, at 1 (1890). 
 10. Id. 
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that states possess appropriate incentives to generate impartial rules 
with respect to intrastate restraints that produce no interstate harm. 
Abandoning the substantial effects test and retracting the scope of 
the Sherman Act would reboot competitive federalism in the antitrust 
field. The resulting competition between state “laboratories of 
democracy” would presumably generate a variety of substantive and 
institutional solutions to various antitrust problems, as states vie for 
producers and consumers by offering rival packages of antitrust doctrine 
and enforcement institutions. 
Restoring the pre-1948 regime would also radically shrink the 
category of state-approved restraints potentially subject to the Act. 
Instead of state regulation of local billboards and the like, state action 
cases reaching the Court would involve restraints imposing substantial 
interstate harm. This new framing could force the current Court, less 
friendly to regulation than its post-New Deal predecessors, to reconsider 
its hands-off approach to state-approved restraints. Narrowing the 
Sherman Act’s reach could ironically encourage more robust preemption 
of state-approved restraints. 
Finally, the history recounted here would alter the question posed 
in state action cases. The Court’s state action decisions emphasize that 
Congress did not anticipate Sherman Act preemption of state-
approved restraints. However, the Court is answering an anachronistic 
question. The 1890 Congress would have assumed that state-approved 
direct restraints of interstate commerce would fall prey to the Court’s 
regime of implied preemption, a regime later eclipsed by the Court’s 
more permissive dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Thus, the 
real question for a Court reconsidering the Act’s treatment of state-
approved restraints is how Congress would have treated such restraints 
absent implied preemption, and this question could produce a quite 
different answer. 
Part I of this Article reviews the Court’s pre-1948 jurisprudence 
regarding the scope of the Sherman Act, particularly the articulation 
of the direct/indirect standard and its application to intrastate restraints. 
Part II recounts the Supreme Court’s post-New Deal expansion of the Act 
to reach intrastate restraints that induce substantial but fortuitous effects 
on interstate commerce. Part III details the three rationales the Court has 
offered to justify rejection of the direct/indirect standard in favor of the 
substantial effects test. Part IV reviews the content of the Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence when Congress debated and passed 
the Sherman Act. Part V draws upon the lessons of this review and 
assesses the original meaning of the phrase “restraint of . . . commerce 
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among the several States,” employing several accepted canons of 
construction. This Part also evaluates the contentions that the scope of 
the Sherman Act properly expands with the scope of the commerce power 
and that changed circumstances justify replacing the direct/indirect 
standard with the substantial effects test. Part VI reviews the legislative 
history of the Act. Finally, Part VII explores selected implications of the 
finding that the Court’s adoption of the substantial effects test was 
unwarranted. 
I.    EARLY CASE LAW AND THE DIRECT/INDIRECT STANDARD: 1890–1948 
Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act bans contracts “in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States.”11 Thus, a contract “in restraint 
of trade” does not violate the Act unless it also restrains “commerce 
among the several States.”12 For several decades, the Supreme Court 
read this latter phrase to place meaningful limits on the statute’s reach, 
leaving states with exclusive authority over a large portion of the nation’s 
trade restraints.13 “Commerce,” the Court said, consisted of “intercourse 
and traffic,” including transportation and sale or barter of goods.14 
Accordingly, the statute reached agreements setting rates for interstate 
transportation or prices of goods exchanged across state lines.15 However, 
the Act generally did not reach intrastate restraints, i.e., agreements 
governing commerce confined to a single state, such as cartels in one state 
fixing prices charged to consumers in that same state.16 
                                               
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 12. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 494–95 (1940) (“[T]he phrase 
‘restraint of trade’ . . . was made the means of defining the activities prohibited. The 
addition of the words ‘or commerce among the several states’ . . . was the means used 
to relate the prohibited restraint of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional 
purposes.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 
U.S. 179, 183–84 (1906) (holding that the Act did not reach a covenant limiting 
competition within waters of single state); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 
175 U.S. 211, 247–48 (1899) (holding that the Act did not reach intrastate cartels). 
 14. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 241. 
 15. Id. (holding that the Act reaches any contract that “directly restrains not alone 
the manufacture, but the purchase, sale or exchange of the manufactured commodity 
among the several States”); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 
(1898) (applying the Act to agreement governing interstate railroad rates). 
 16. Cincinnati Packet Co., 200 U.S. at 183–84; Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 247–48; see 
also Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 80 (1925) (explaining that the 
challenged restraint did not limit “the freedom of the [out-of-state] manufacturer to 
sell and ship or of the local contractor to buy” and thus was intrastate). 
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Some intrastate restraints also affected interstate commerce, suggesting 
a possible exception to this general rule. In such cases, the Court 
distinguished between “direct” and “indirect” effects, holding that the 
statute only reached intrastate restraints producing the former.17 The 
Court drew the direct/indirect standard from its Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.18 That case law articulated a vision of “dual federalism,” 
which treated state and national authority over most economic activity as 
mutually exclusive.19 
Decisions implementing this vision allocated to Congress sole authority 
over most interstate activity, leaving states with exclusive authority over 
conduct occurring only within their borders. To preserve Congress’s 
authority, the Court invalidated state regulation of local activity that 
affected interstate commerce directly and thus effectively regulated such 
commerce, exercising power solely committed to Congress.20 Where, 
however, state regulation only affected interstate commerce indirectly, 
                                               
 17. Compare United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183–84 (1911) 
(finding that the Act applied to transactions creating a national monopoly and thus 
directly restraining interstate commerce), and Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 
221 U.S. 1, 68–69, 74–75 (1911) (same), and Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 
397 (1905) (holding that the Act applied to intrastate restraints with interstate 
commerce as their “direct object” and “object of attack”), with Cincinnati Packet Co., 
200 U.S. at 183–84 (declining to extend the Act to agreement where “interference with 
[interstate] commerce is insignificant and incidental, and not the dominant purpose 
of the contract”), and Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 591–92 (1898) (declining 
to extend the Act to agreement that “indirectly . . . add[ed] to the price paid by a 
purchaser”), and Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 616–18 (1898) (declining 
to extend the Act to activities affecting interstate commerce “in the most roundabout 
and indirect manner”). 
 18. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–30 (explaining that the Act reached 
agreements producing the same impact as state restraints directly affecting interstate 
commerce); Anderson, 171 U.S. at 616 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 473 
(1888)) (“‘[T]he acknowledged powers of a State may be exerted and applied in such 
a manner as to affect foreign or interstate commerce without being intended to 
operate as commercial regulations.’ The same is true as to [particular contracts among 
firms in an industry that] . . . regulat[e] the conduct of their business among 
themselves and with the public.”). 
 19. See infra notes 20–49 and accompanying text (describing the development and 
content of this jurisprudence). 
 20. See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886) 
(invalidating state regulation of intrastate railroad rates directly burdening interstate 
commerce); see also Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1096–99 (2000) (describing early twentieth 
century antitrust decisions as exemplifying Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
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such provisions remained unscathed.21 Given the assumption of mutually 
exclusive regulatory domains, decisions clarifying the scope of state 
authority also defined the affirmative scope of congressional power.22 
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.23 exemplified the Court’s 
reliance upon the direct/indirect standard to delimit the scope of the 
Sherman Act.24 There, a non-union coal company exported most of its 
output to other states.25 A union sought recognition as the exclusive 
representative of the firm’s employees and termination of non-union 
workers, violently closing the company’s mine.26 Lower courts condemned 
the conspiracy under the Sherman Act.27 A unanimous Supreme Court 
reversed.28 
The Court conceded that the conspiracy restrained trade and 
prevented the production and export of coal to other states.29 The 
Court also found that the union consistently discouraged the existence 
of non-union mines because competition from such mines threatened 
union wages.30 Unionization was “a means of lessening interstate 
competition for union operators” and “lessen[ed] the pressure of 
those operators for reduction of the union scale.”31 Nonetheless, the 
Court held that this was “a secondary or ancillary motive.”32 The main 
motive was to “better[] the conditions and wages of [union] workers” 
at the local mine.33 While the union’s success could have encouraged 
similar firms to maintain union shops, impacting interstate commerce, 
this result was “remote” and did not justify application of the Act.34 The 
                                               
 21. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1888) (explaining that a state’s 
ban on alcohol production impacted interstate commerce merely indirectly, despite 
intent to export such alcohol, and thus exceeded the scope of the commerce power). 
 22. See, e.g., infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. 
 23. 259 U.S. 344 (1922). 
 24. See id. at 408–13; see also Cushman, supra note 20, at 1096–98 (discussing 
Coronado Coal as an exemplar of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 25. Id. at 412. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 413. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 412. 
 30. Id. (reporting that unionization producing higher wages increased costs by 
seventeen to twenty cents per ton). 
 31. Id. at 408. 
 32. Id. at 408–09 (“Obstruction to coal mining is not a direct obstruction to 
interstate commerce in coal, although it, of course, may affect it by reducing the 
amount of coal to be carried in that commerce.”). 
 33. Id. at 408. 
 34. Id. at 413. 
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Act would only reach such conduct if the union had intended to impact 
interstate commerce.35 While sufficient, express proof of intent was not 
necessary. Instead, drawing upon its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
the Court said such an intent “must be inferred” if the agreement 
“necessarily [had] a direct, material and substantial effect to restrain 
[interstate commerce].”36 
A direct effect would arise, the Court said, if the defendants 
attempted “to unionize mines whose product was important, actually 
or potentially, in affecting prices in interstate commerce.”37 Such a 
conspiracy would not “involve interstate commerce intrinsically” 
because the agreement would not govern any interstate transactions.38 
Still, the (intrastate) restraint would “affect[] interstate commerce so 
directly as to be within the federal regulatory power.”39 The Court 
invoked a prior case, United States v. Patten,40 where the defendants’ 
intrastate conspiracy had produced such an effect by cornering the 
market in cotton traded on the New York City Cotton Exchange.41 
Although the reduced cotton supply was not itself interstate 
commerce, the object of the conspiracy was “to obtain control of the 
available supply and to enhance the price to all buyers in every market 
of the country.”42 The “necessary effect” was to “directly . . . burden the 
due course of trade among the States and inflict upon the public the 
injuries which the [Sherman] Act was designed to prevent,” i.e., to 
increase the price of cotton sold across state lines.43 By contrast, the 
restraint before the Court could have no similar impact because the 
mine produced a small share of the nation’s coal, so that shuttering 
the mine would not alter interstate coal prices.44 Thus, the 
direct/indirect standard defined the affirmative limits of the “federal 
regulatory power” and therefore the Sherman Act.45 
                                               
 35. Id. at 410–11. 
 36. Id. at 411. 
 37. Id. at 409. 
 38. Id. at 410; see also Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 80 (1925) 
(explaining that the challenged restraint was intrastate because it did not limit 
freedom of out-of-state firms to supply local contractors). 
 39. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 410. 
 40. 226 U.S. 525 (1913). 
 41. Id. at 536–39. 
 42. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 410 (citing Patten, 226 U.S. 525). 
 43. Id. (citing Patten, 226 U.S. 525). 
 44. Id. at 412 (stating that challenged conspiracy “would have no appreciable 
effect upon the price of coal or non-union competition”). 
 45. See id. at 410 (citing Patten, 226 U.S. 525). 
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The Court reiterated this standard several times, including in cases 
where targets or proponents of the restraint purchased inputs from 
other states. Such restraints, while local, ultimately induced a reduction 
in interstate purchases by the affected firms.46 While the Court continued 
to invoke “intent” as an element of the test, results effectively turned on 
the probable economic impact of the challenged restraint, which courts 
ascertained after a flexible and fact-intensive analysis.47 According to this 
case law, a mere reduction in interstate purchases or sales by targets or 
proponents of such restraints did not justify application of the Act, as such 
interstate impacts were “clearly incidental, indirect and remote.”48 For 
several decades after passage of the Sherman Act, then, the Court 
consistently and repeatedly allocated to states exclusive authority over 
intrastate restraints that produced only intrastate harm and affected 
interstate commerce indirectly. Congress, however, retained exclusive 
authority over those intrastate restraints that affected interstate 
commerce directly. Thus, the Act only reached those intrastate restraints 
that produced harmful impacts in the form of non-competitive prices 
for interstate transactions, injuring consumers in multiple states.49 
                                               
 46. See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1933) (holding 
that strikes aimed at local builders exceeded the commerce power and Sherman Act 
although they reduced interstate steel purchases); id. at 107 (“It is this exclusively local 
aim, and not the fortuitous and incidental effect upon interstate commerce, which 
gives character to the conspiracy.”); Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 
80 (1925) (finding that the Act did not reach conspiracy to deprive local rivals of inputs 
because “[t]he effect upon, and interference with, interstate trade, if any, were clearly 
incidental, indirect and remote”); United Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & 
Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 471 (1924) (declining to apply Act to boycott of trunk 
manufacturers selling most of their output in interstate commerce). 
 47. See, e.g., Indus. Ass’n of S.F., 268 U.S. at 77–81 (assessing impact of restraint 
absent intent to restrain interstate commerce); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1, 66, 70–71 (1911) (describing direct/indirect test as fact-intensive 
standard); see also infra note 195 and accompanying text (characterizing Commerce 
Clause’s direct/indirect test as a standard and not a rule). 
 48. Indus. Ass’n of S.F., 268 U.S. at 80. 
 49. See In re Op. of the Justices, 99 N.E. 294, 294–95 (Mass. 1912) (concluding that 
state lacked authority over agreements restraining interstate commerce); James May, 
Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach 
of State Antitrust Law, 1880–1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 518 (1987) (“Federal and state 
jurists often declared that states could not constitutionally regulate anticompetitive 
activity within interstate commerce, [establishing] some significant limitations on the 
scope of state antitrust provisions . . . .”); infra notes 333–38 and accompanying text 
(explaining Addyston Pipe’s conclusion that state and federal authority over trade 
restraints was mutually exclusive). 
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States exercised their exclusive authority in various ways.50 Some 
employed corporate law, invalidating certain anticompetitive practices.51 
All employed contract law, declining to enforce unreasonable restraints.52 
At least one relied upon a general law against conspiracies to injure 
trade.53 Finally, beginning in the 1880s, numerous states enacted antitrust 
legislation governing intrastate restraints.54 State antitrust enforcement 
activity exceeded that of the federal government for two decades after 
passage of the Sherman Act.55 Between 1890 and 1919, Texas collected 
more antitrust fines than the United States.56 State and federal courts 
sustained application of these statutes to local activity affecting interstate 
commerce indirectly.57 
During this period, then, a robust regime of competitive federalism 
generated antitrust doctrine and enforcement institutions governing a 
large proportion of the nation’s trade restraints. Because competing 
states internalized the costs and benefits of these rival packages of doctrine 
and institutions, such interjurisdictional competition presumably enhanced 
the quality of such regimes, improving society’s welfare compared to an 
allocation of authority in which a single lawgiver produced legislation 
                                               
 50. See May, supra note 49, at 497–507 (describing state antitrust regulation of 
intrastate restraints from 1880 to 1918). 
 51. See, e.g., People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. 834, 840 (N.Y. 1890) 
(holding that a corporation exceeded its charter by delegating decisions to rivals); 
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, 286–87 (Ohio 1892); see 
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the Firm: An 
Historical Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 76–85 (1990) (exploring evolution of state 
corporate law in response to anticompetitive mergers). 
 52. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281–82 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(summarizing common law of contract that governed enforceability of trade 
restraints). 
 53. See Hooker & Woodward v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349, 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) 
(declining to enforce price fixing agreement as contravening statute banning “act[s] 
injurious to trade or commerce”). 
 54. See May, supra note 49, at 499 (reporting that thirteen states enacted antitrust 
legislation before 1890, twenty-seven by 1900, and thirty-five by 1915). 
 55. Id. at 499–501. 
 56. Id. at 501–02. 
 57. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 422 (1910) 
(rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to state antitrust regulation incidentally 
affecting interstate commerce); In re Op. of the Justices, 99 N.E. 294, 295 (Mass. 1912) 
(finding that proposed antitrust statute reached only intrastate restraints and thus did 
not regulate interstate commerce, even though the statute “may interfere to some 
extent with such commerce” by “incidentally, but not primarily, affecting” it); May, 
supra note 49, at 521 n.130 (“[S]tates were left substantial room . . . to regulate despite 
an effect on interstate commerce . . . .”). 
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applicable to all the nation’s trade restraints.58 By contrast, the national 
government generated the doctrine and institutions governing restraints 
that exercised market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers, 
because the interstate nature of such harm raised the prospect that state 
regulation of these restraints would produce self-interested results. 
II.    POST-NEW DEAL EXPANSION 
A.   Wickard, Mandeville Island Farms, and the Substantial Effects Test 
As explained earlier, the Supreme Court drew the direct/indirect 
standard that determined the scope of the Sherman Act from its 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, treating state and national authority 
over trade restraints as mutually exclusive.59 During the 1940s, the 
Court rejected this framework. Most famously, in Wickard v. Filburn,60 
the Court rejected both dual federalism and the direct/indirect 
standard as valid expositions of the Commerce Clause.61 The Court 
characterized the direct/indirect standard as exemplifying the 
“mechanical application[] of [a] legal formula[]” that obscured the 
relevant inquiry—namely, the “economic effect[]” of the regulated 
activity.62 Decisions employing this standard to define the affirmative 
reach of Congress’s power had erred, the Court said, by assuming that 
state and congressional power over activities affecting interstate 
commerce were mutually exclusive, with the result that Congress could 
not regulate activities impacting interstate commerce indirectly.63 
                                               
 58. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 23, 34 (1983) (describing conditions, including lack of interstate externalities, 
under which competitive federalism “causes a powerful tendency toward optimal 
legislation”); Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: 
A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 403, 451–59 (2004) 
(describing the benefits of competitive federalism in production of antitrust doctrine 
and asserting that state and federal antitrust law “will iterate more quickly toward the 
optimal set of legal rules” under this regime); infra note 188 and accompanying text 
(collecting additional authorities discussing conditions under which interjurisdictional 
competition induces a tendency toward optimal legislation). 
 59. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
 60. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 61. Id. at 120, 125. 
 62. Id. at 123–24. But see Alan J. Meese, Wickard Through an Antitrust Lens, 60 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1335, 1377–82 (2019) (explaining that the Sherman Act’s direct/indirect 
standard focused precisely on whether challenged restraints produced the prohibited 
economic effect). 
 63. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120–21. 
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The Court replaced the direct/indirect standard with the “substantial 
effects” test.64 Under this approach, Congress could regulate any activity 
that produced a “substantial economic effect” on interstate commerce, 
even if the effect was indirect and states possessed coextensive authority 
over such conduct.65 The Court also held that Congress could reach 
conduct that individually produced a trivial impact on interstate 
commerce if the entire class of activities, when aggregated together, 
induced a substantial effect.66 
Wickard was not an antitrust case but instead involved a 1938 statute 
expressly regulating local farm production.67 The Sherman Act 
remained unchanged. Still, just six years after Wickard, in Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,68 the Court rejected the 
direct/indirect standard as an appropriate exposition of the Sherman 
Act.69 The Court embraced Wickard’s critique of the direct/indirect 
standard, including the claim that the standard was mechanical and 
artificial, obscuring the actual economic impact of challenged 
restraints.70 The Court also characterized the standard as an artifact of 
discredited dual federalism.71 Just as the commerce power had come 
to reach any conduct that produced a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, so too did the Sherman Act reach any agreement “in 
restraint of trade” that produced such an effect.72 
Some language in Mandeville Island Farms suggested that only 
harmful effects counted as “substantial” for purposes of the newly 
minted substantial effects test.73 However, the Court soon confirmed 
that harmless and incidental impacts on interstate commerce could 
                                               
 64. Id. at 125. 
 65. See id. (explaining that classification of an effect as direct or indirect has no 
bearing on whether the economic effect is “substantial”). 
 66. Id. at 127–29. 
 67. Id. at 114–15 (discussing and applying the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 
Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31). 
 68. 334 U.S. 219 (1948). 
 69. Id. at 243–44. 
 70. Id. at 230–32 (invoking Wickard’s “familiar story of the progression of [Commerce 
Clause] decision[s]”). 
 71. See id. at 229–30 (critiquing United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), 
and subsequent decisions “embracing the same artificially drawn lines”). 
 72. See id. at 232–34. 
 73. See id. at 234 (asking “whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse 
to Congress’[s] paramount policy . . . to constitute a forbidden consequence”). 
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nonetheless be “substantial.”74 Burke v. Ford75 exemplifies this approach. 
There, Oklahoma liquor retailers challenged a horizontal agreement 
allocating territories among the state’s liquor wholesalers.76 The 
intrastate agreement could only injure the state’s own retailers and 
consumers.77 While wholesalers purchased liquor from out-of-state 
firms, the restraint did not govern such purchases.78 There was no 
indication that the restraint impacted price, output, or quality in any 
interstate liquor market.79 
The Court conceded that the agreement did not itself restrain 
interstate commerce.80 Nonetheless, the Court invoked Mandeville 
Island Farms and a subsequent decision holding that the Sherman Act 
reached intrastate restraints producing a “substantial effect” on 
interstate commerce.81 The Act thus reached the wholesalers’ cartel 
because a successful conspiracy would reduce in-state liquor sales and 
thus wholesalers’ interstate liquor purchases.82 The Court did not 
assess the possible impact of that reduction on the price or overall 
output of interstate liquor. Nor was there any reason to believe the 
conspiracy could have such an impact or that Oklahoma was unable to 
protect consumers from its wholesalers.83 Nonetheless, the Court 
                                               
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Employing Lathers Ass’n, 347 U.S. 198, 200 (1954) 
(finding that agreement restricting entry into the Chicago lathing trade substantially 
affected interstate commerce because lathers purchased some supplies from other 
states). While the complaint asserted that the challenged restrictions on the Chicago 
lathing trade also “directly restrain[ed] and affect[ed] the interstate flow of lathing 
materials,” the Court did not assert or suggest that the complaint alleged any interstate 
harm. Id. 
 75. 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
 76. Id. at 320. 
 77. See id. at 320–22. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 320–21; cf. supra notes 17–45 and accompanying text (describing 
decisions holding that such an impact was necessary to apply Act to intrastate restraints). 
 80. See Burke, 389 U.S. at 321–22 (holding that despite the lack of direct impact on 
interstate commerce, the “wholesalers’ market division inevitably affected interstate 
commerce”). 
 81. See id. at 321 (citing United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass’n, 347 U.S. 186 
(1954); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)) 
(“[A]ctivity which does not itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope 
of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce.”). 
 82. Id. at 322 (“The wholesalers’ territorial division here almost surely resulted in 
fewer sales to retailers—hence fewer purchases from out-of-state distillers—than would 
have occurred had free competition prevailed . . . .”). 
 83. Cf. supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text (recounting robust state antitrust 
enforcement at the turn of the twentieth century). 
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found that the surmised incidental impact on wholesalers’ liquor 
purchases was a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.84 Here again, 
the Court invoked effects previously deemed “incidental,” “indirect,” 
“obscure,” “remote,” and “fortuitous” to justify application of the Act 
to an intrastate restraint producing only localized harm.85 
Modern decisions have repeatedly reiterated the substantial effects 
test announced in Mandeville Island Farms.86 Thus, the Act now reaches 
numerous restraints that produce harm confined to a single state—
that is, restraints that do not alter the price or quality of any product 
sold in interstate markets.87 To be sure, the substantial effects test 
captures restraints that impose interstate harm and thereby qualified 
as “direct” under the direct/indirect standard. However, by design, the 
test also captures local restraints that produce no interstate harm and 
impact interstate commerce only indirectly. This change has substantially 
increased the scope of the Sherman Act, while simultaneously leaving 
states with concurrent authority over restraints within their borders that 
also affect interstate commerce. 
                                               
 84. See Burke, 389 U.S. at 321–22 (reasoning that prices increased and unit sales 
decreased due to reduced competition). 
 85. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that 
similar effects did not justify application of the Act). 
 86. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 332–33 (1991) (holding 
that the Act reached a group boycott by one hospital’s physicians against a single 
physician); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 245 (1980) 
(explaining that the Act reached price fixing by city’s realtors because purchasers 
often sought out-of-state financing); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 
744 (1976) (holding that the Act reached a scheme preventing a hospital’s expansion 
because, inter alia, the expanding hospital would have purchased additional supplies 
from out-of-state vendors); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784–85 (1975) 
(explaining that the Act reached an agreement setting title search fees in one county). 
 87. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 501 (2015) 
(invalidating agreement between the state’s dentists to exclude non-dentists from 
teeth-whitening); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771, 773, 776–77 (1999) 
(evaluating challenge to agreement between state’s dentists not to engage in 
fraudulent advertising); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463–66 (1986) 
(invalidating agreement between local dentists not to provide insurers with x-rays); 
Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4–5 (1984) (evaluating challenge 
to tying contract imposed by a single hospital in one city); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
U.S. 720, 726–28 (1977) (evaluating challenge to a horizontal agreement between 
Illinois firms manufacturing bricks for Illinois highway projects); United States v. 
Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 94, 110–11 (1975) (evaluating a merger between 
Georgia banks); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 271, 274 (1966) 
(invalidating a merger between Los Angeles grocery stores). 
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B.   Substantial Effects and the Collapse of Competitive Federalism 
The Court’s significant expansion of the Act and recognition of 
concurrent authority over numerous local restraints radically altered 
the balance between state and federal power over trade restraints. This 
major reallocation of regulatory authority undermined the robust 
regime of competitive federalism that characterized pre-1948 regulation 
of trade restraints.88 Many restraints were now subject to rules produced 
by two sovereigns. Because the Sherman Act provided a regulatory floor, 
states lacked incentives to generate innovative doctrinal approaches 
less interventionist than Sherman Act doctrine.89 To be sure, states 
remained free to impose more interventionist rules, condemning 
conduct that courts treat as perfectly reasonable under the Sherman 
Act. However, the prospect of aggressive state antitrust enforcement 
policy has led to sporadic federal judicial invalidation of state antitrust 
laws and calls for more such preemption.90 Indeed, Richard Posner has 
called for preemption of all state antitrust regulation of conduct that 
affects interstate commerce.91 Thus, state efforts to adopt intrusive 
antitrust regulation vis-á-vis local restraints necessarily take place in the 
shadow of possible federal reaction, further attenuating the sort of 
                                               
 88. See supra notes 17–22, 50–58 and accompanying text (explaining how pre-
Wickard regime allocated regulatory authority over trade restraints into mutually 
exclusive domains, thereby supporting a robust regime of competitive federalism). 
 89. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and Commerce, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
935, 937 (2013) (asserting that competitive federalism can only induce optimal rules 
if, inter alia, states can “select any set of laws they desire”); Alan J. Meese, Regulation of 
Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or 
Competition Between the States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 85–86 (1999) (explaining 
how states’ refusal to recognize other states’ rules governing intrastate conduct can 
undermine incentives of latter states to generate optimal legal rules). 
 90. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284–85 (1972) (rejecting both the Sherman 
Act challenge to the baseball reserve system and the application of state antitrust laws 
because such laws “would conflict with federal policy” (i.e., the Court’s interpretation 
of the Sherman Act) and burden interstate commerce); Major League Baseball v. Crist, 
331 F.3d 1177, 1179 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that Sherman Act preempted state 
antitrust regulation of major league baseball). 
 91. See Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State 
Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2004) (advocating such preemption); 
see also Michael E. DeBow, Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, 1–
2, 8 (Oct. 26, 2005) (advocating federal preemption of state antitrust laws and 
limitations on state officials’ ability to invoke federal antitrust laws). 
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incentives necessary to drive robust competition between the states.92 
Perhaps because of this fear, a supermajority of states all but require 
their courts to read their own antitrust statutes to replicate federal law.93 
States do retain exclusive authority over conduct producing no 
impact of any sort on interstate commerce, raising the prospect of 
continued rivalry between states to generate doctrine governing such 
restraints. However, the pervasive integration of the nation’s economy 
has likely reduced the size of this category to a trivial portion of the 
nation’s commerce, weakening states’ incentives to produce a separate 
set of rules governing such restraints.94 Indeed, studies of state antitrust 
activity conclude that most states bring few, if any, antitrust cases.95 
While competition between the states to produce certain bodies of law 
is alive and well,96 competitive federalism in antitrust is on life support 
or worse, depriving society of the benefits of interjurisdictional rivalry.97 
The revised allocation of regulatory authority and the prospect of 
preemption was particularly salient with respect to restraints that states 
themselves approved. Shortly after Wickard, the Supreme Court held 
that state-approved restraints usually do not violate the Sherman Act.98 
Subsequent decisions elaborating on this so-called “state action 
                                               
 92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining how depriving states of 
exclusive authority over local conduct undermines incentives driving competitive 
federalism). 
 93. See, e.g., Richard A. Duncan & Alison K. Guernsey, Waiting for the Other Shoe to 
Drop: Will State Courts Follow Leegin?, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 173, 174 (2008) (finding that 
thirty-six states have stated intent to “adhere strongly” or “moderately strongly” to 
federal antitrust precedent when implementing their own antitrust laws). 
 94. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 1012 (5th ed. 2016) (stating that the Sherman Act now reaches “almost 
any market or transaction with more than a trivial impact on interstate commerce”). 
 95. See Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, The Determinants of State-Level 
Antitrust Activity, 37 REV. INDUS. ORGANIZATIONS 179, 189 (2010) (explaining that seven 
states brought no antitrust cases between 1992 and 2006 and that many states brought 
no cases in most years). 
 96. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6, 12, 15 
(1993) (contending that competition between states for corporate charters has induced 
production of corporate law superior to that which a national regime would produce). 
 97. Cf. Feinberg & Reynolds, supra note 95, at 189 (characterizing the lack of state 
antitrust enforcement in recent years); supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing 
benefits of interjurisdictional competition in the production of antitrust doctrine). 
 98. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 345, 352 (1943) (rejecting Sherman Act 
challenge to state-imposed restriction on raisin output, over ninety percent of which 
was exported in interstate commerce); id. at 351–52 (describing two exceptions to such 
immunity). 
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doctrine” conditioned immunity for state-sponsored restraints upon 
states’ satisfaction of certain procedural requirements, including active 
supervision by disinterested individuals of state-endorsed private 
restraints.99 Failure to satisfy these requirements resulted in Sherman 
Act preemption of such restraints, overriding states’ regulatory choices 
and obscuring accountability for the adoption of anti-competitive 
regulation.100 Nearly all decisions elaborating on these requirements 
have involved intrastate restraints that affected interstate commerce only 
fortuitously and were thus beyond the scope of the Act before 1948.101 As 
one scholar explained, the state action doctrine is only necessary because 
“the Sherman Act has grown with the growth of the commerce power.”102 
The Court’s recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC103 exemplifies the impact of the substantial effects test 
on Sherman Act treatment of local, state-approved restraints. The 
Federal Trade Commission challenged a horizontal conspiracy between 
dentists on the state’s dental licensing board to define dentistry to 
include teeth whitening, thereby excluding unlicensed individuals from 
this occupation.104 The Commission did not assert that the Board’s 
                                               
 99. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 503–15 (2015) 
(rejecting state action immunity because state did not actively supervise self-interested 
regulators); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 639–40 (1992) (rejecting such 
immunity because agency did not adequately supervise private actors authorized to fix 
prices); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105, 
114 (1980) (holding that compliance with California statute requiring parties to enter 
minimum resale price maintenance agreements violated the Sherman Act because 
state failed to properly supervise and review resulting wholesale wine prices). 
 100. See, e.g., N.C. Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 513–15; Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 639–
40; Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 113–14. 
 101. See, e.g., N.C. Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 500–02 (agreement between dentists 
providing local services); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 219–
20 (2013) (merger between local hospitals); Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 624–25 
(price fixing by local title insurers); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 
499 U.S. 365, 367–68 (1991) (monopolization of metropolitan billboard market); 
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 261 (1986) (municipal rent control); Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 353 (1977) (ban on intrastate lawyer advertising); 
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 581 (1976) (state-approved requirement 
that public utility’s customers also purchase light bulbs from the firm); see also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 644 (2006) 
(characterizing Parker as the sole Supreme Court state action decision involving 
restraint producing interstate harm). 
 102. See Easterbrook, supra note 58, at 41. 
 103. 574 U.S. 494 (2015). 
 104. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2013), 
aff’d, 574 U.S. 494 (2015). While the Commission brought the case under section 5 of 
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conspiracy harmed those seeking teeth-whitening services outside of 
North Carolina.105 The Court of Appeals determined that “the Board 
successfully expelled non-dentist providers from the North Carolina 
teeth-whitening market.”106 
Nonetheless, the Commission found that federal antitrust law reached 
such intrastate conduct, invoking fortuitous interstate impacts.107 For 
instance, some unlicensed teeth-whiteners purchased inputs from other 
states, and some forwarded cease-and-desist letters to out-of-state 
creditors.108 The Commission held that the agreement violated the 
federal antitrust laws because the state did not adequately supervise 
self-interested individuals regulating the practice of dentistry.109 The 
Supreme Court affirmed, albeit without addressing application of 
federal law to this intrastate conspiracy.110 Thus, the decision left the 
state free to adopt the very same harmful restraint, so long as unbiased 
state officials signed off.111 Absent the post-1948 substantial effects test, 
the conspiracy would have exceeded the reach of the Act, leaving North 
Carolina and other states free to structure their regulatory processes 
without Supreme Court oversight. 
III.    THE COURT’S EXPLANATION FOR CHANGE 
Repudiation of several decades of precedent requires some explanation. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not offered a thorough or consistent 
rationale for replacing the direct/indirect standard with the substantial 
                                               
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018), it invoked Sherman 
Act case law to justify application of the FTC Act to the challenged local restraints. N.C. 
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 370–71. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id.; see also N.C. Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 501 (offering similar 
characterization). 
 107. See N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. 75, 158 (2011) (finding that the 
board’s actions have “a substantial effect on interstate commerce”). 
 108. Id. at 156 (citing Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 744 
(1976)) (invoking “[p]urchases by a defendant of out-of-state goods” to support a 
finding that the conspiracy “substantially affects interstate commerce”). 
 109. See id. at 78, 86 (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)). 
 110. See N.C. Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 515–16 (holding that “[the Sherman Act] 
does not authorize the States to abandon markets to the unsupervised control of active 
market participants,” with the result that state action immunity did not protect 
challenged agreement). 
 111. See, e.g., id. at 503–15 (explaining “active supervision” requirements necessary 
for application of state action immunity). 
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effects test. Indeed, only one decision—Mandeville Island Farms—has 
devoted more than a paragraph to explaining the vast expansion of the 
Act vis-á-vis intrastate restraints.112 
The relevant case law recounts three different considerations that 
purportedly support the modern approach. First, the Court has 
claimed that the 1890 Congress had a broader view of its commerce 
power than that seemingly reflected in Commerce Clause precedents 
the Court invoked when it first determined the Sherman Act’s reach.113 
Thus, the Court has claimed that pre-1948 Sherman Act decisions 
improperly invoked the jurisprudence of dual federalism in place 
when Congress passed the Sherman Act and incorrectly treated state 
and federal authority over trade restraints as mutually exclusive. Because 
of these mistakes, pre-1890 decisions validating state regulations with 
merely “indirect” impacts on interstate commerce erroneously fixed the 
boundary between state and federal authority, thereby limiting 
Congress’s power and the resulting reach of the Act.114 Early Sherman 
Act decisions thus thwarted the purported will of Congress to exercise 
the full extent of its commerce power, including concurrent authority 
over local restraints that impacted interstate commerce indirectly.115 
This assertion echoed Wickard’s critique of dual federalism as well as 
Depression-era academics who had claimed that pre-1890 precedents 
recognized congressional authority to regulate conduct affecting 
                                               
 112. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229–
33 (1948). 
 113. See id. at 229–30; infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 114. Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 229 n.8 (concluding that United States v. 
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), and progeny erroneously embraced “[Chief 
Justice] Marshall’s idea of the mutual exclusiveness of state and national power in this 
area and ignor[ed] the later evolution of different conceptions in Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens, [53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852)]”); id. at 229 (asserting that E.C. Knight 
invoked “mechanical distinctions with substantially nullifying effects” on the coverage 
of the commerce power and the Act); id. at 229 n.8 (criticizing E.C. Knight and progeny 
for relying upon terms of art deriving from Commerce Clause cases assessing the 
validity of state, not federal, statutes); United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 
533, 545 (1944) (“[L]egal formulae devised to uphold state power cannot uncritically 
be accepted as trustworthy guides to determine Congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
 115. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 229; Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 
544–45 (rejecting decisions holding that insurance is not commerce because such 
decisions involved Commerce Clause challenges to state law); id. at 558 (contending 
that Congress meant to exercise the full extent of its commerce power); see also supra 
notes 86–87 and accompanying text (discussing additional decisions reaching 
identical conclusions). 
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interstate commerce.116 To support this claim, the Court has asserted 
that there is no support for dual federalism in the statute’s legislative 
history.117 
Second, the Court has claimed that the scope of the Act expands 
“along with expanding notions of Congressional power.”118 Such 
expansion, it is said, effectuates Congress’s desire to go “as far as the 
Constitution permits” by exercising the “utmost extent of its Constitutional 
power” when enacting the statute.119 Thus, even if the Court at first properly 
held that Congress embraced dual federalism, mutual exclusivity, and the 
direct/indirect standard, the scope of the Act supposedly expands 
along with expansion of Congress’s commerce power, in whatever 
context. The Court’s invocation of Wickard’s substantial effects test—
an entirely new standard governing the scope of the commerce 
power—in Mandeville Island Farms exemplifies this approach.120 Here 
again, the Court has invoked legislative history in support of this 
contention.121 
                                               
 116. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121–22 (1942) (contending that E.C. 
Knight incorrectly treated decisions validating state laws as establishing limits on 
congressional power); see also E.S. Corwin, The Schechter Case—Landmark, or What?, 13 
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 151, 164–65 (1936) (contending that pre-1890 decisions recognized 
concurrent congressional authority over intrastate conduct affecting interstate 
commerce indirectly and characterizing E.C. Knight as the first decision to the 
contrary); Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47 HARV. 
L. REV. 1335, 1356 (1934) (concluding that decisions validating state authority did not 
limit congressional authority). 
 117. See infra notes 422–30 and accompanying text. 
 118. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329 n.8 (1991); McLain v. Real 
Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (recounting how expansion 
of the Sherman Act has tracked expansion of the scope of the commerce power); 
Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976). 
 119. Summit Health, Ltd., 500 U.S. at 328 n.7, 329 n.10 (quoting 20 CONG. REC. 1167 
(1889)) (concluding that Congress intended the Sherman Act to reach “as far as the 
Constitution permits”); Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 558 (“Congress wanted to go 
to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly 
agreements.”); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974) 
(quoting Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 558) (same); United States v. Frankfort 
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 
U.S. 469, 495 (1940)) (same). 
 120. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 229–31; see also McLain, 444 U.S. at 241 
(citing Hosp. Bldg. Co., 425 U.S. at 743) (invoking Wickard to exemplify the breadth of the 
commerce power and opining that the “reach of the Sherman Act” is “correspondingly 
broad”). 
 121. See infra notes 422–23 and accompanying text. 
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Third and finally, the Court has asserted that changes in technology, 
commercial practices, and deepening integration of the national 
economy have justified expanding Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause and the correlative reach of the Sherman Act.122 
The Court has invoked similar grounds for expanding the commerce 
power in other contexts.123 
The first two claims are straightforward assertions about the original 
meaning of the statute, i.e., the legal standard that Congress chose to 
define the Act’s reach and the appropriate evolution of that standard in 
response to expansion of the commerce power. Scholars can evaluate 
these assertions using conventional tools of statutory interpretation. The 
third claim takes the direct/indirect standard animating the original text 
as a given and justifies rejection of that standard as a response to factual 
changes exogenous to the Act. Adoption of the substantial effects test thus 
constitutes a “translation” of unchanged text in response to changes in 
factual context.124 Under this approach, sometimes known as “two-step 
                                               
 122. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd., 500 U.S. at 328–29 (“[A]s the dimensions and 
complexity of our economy have grown, the federal power over commerce, and the 
concomitant coverage of the Sherman Act, have experienced similar expansion.”); 
McLain, 444 U.S. at 241 (“During the near century of Sherman Act experience, forms and 
modes of business and commerce have changed along with changes in communication 
and travel, and innovations in methods of conducting particular businesses have altered 
relationships in commerce. Application of the Act reflects an adaptation to these 
changing circumstances.”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975) 
(applying the Act to local price fixing by lawyers because: “[i]n the modern world it 
cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial 
intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on 
commerce”); Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 230 (stating that the “evolving nature 
of our industrialism” condemned E.C. Knight and progeny); cf. Andrew I. Gavil, 
Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
657, 691 (1993) (citing these decisions for the proposition that “Congress intended to 
fill the void left by the states” and thereby “exercise all of the commerce power that it 
possessed . . . and to permit that power to grow with the times”). 
 123. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (“The volume of 
interstate commerce and the range of commonly accepted objects of government 
regulation have, however, expanded considerably in the last 200 years, and the regulatory 
authority of Congress has expanded along with them. As interstate commerce has 
become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to have effects on 
the national economy, and have accordingly come within the scope of Congress’[s] 
commerce power.”). 
 124. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1189 (1993) 
(suggesting that while one-step originalism is blind to the current context, two-step 
originalism considers that context and still preserves original meaning). This author 
recognizes that originalism is a controversial methodology. However, the Court itself 
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originalism,” changing context may require evolved application of an 
unchanged text, producing results that, while inconsistent with Congress’s 
subjective expectations, nonetheless constitute faithful application of the 
enactment’s original meaning and the legislature’s normative choices.125 
Proponents of original meaning methodology have embraced such 
interpretive translation.126 Moreover, the Sherman Act is no stranger 
to this approach. The foundational decision in Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey v. United States,127 which announced section 1’s “Rule of Reason,” 
requires judges to implement the “public policy” of the Act by 
determining whether agreements create “monopoly” or “the results of 
monopoly.”128 Judicial assessments of particular restraints can evolve over 
time, reflecting “more accurate economic conceptions” regarding the 
impact of such agreements.129 Courts applying section 1 have accordingly 
altered application of the Act in light of evolving economic theory and 
conditions.130 By invoking factual changes to justify the substantial effects 
                                               
has invoked the intent of Congress and claimed that pre-1948 jurisprudence thwarted 
that intent. 
 125. Id. at 1184 (“If the original and current contexts differ, then the meaning of 
the same application in the two contexts may differ as well.”). 
 126. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60–62, 62 n.1 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that judges should apply the normative choices 
inherent in the Fourth Amendment in light of modern technology, including 
“helicopters and telephones”); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(en banc) (Bork, J., concurring) (“We must never hesitate to apply old values to new 
circumstances, whether those circumstances are changes in technology or changes in 
the impact of traditional common law actions.”). 
 127. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 128. See id. at 61 (equating “restraint of trade” with “monopoly and the acts which 
produce the same result as monopoly”). 
 129. Id. at 55 (approving evolving treatment of particular restraints after 
“development of more accurate economic conceptions and the changes in conditions of 
society”); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988) (stating 
that the term “restraint of trade” does not refer to specific types of agreements but 
instead to “a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite 
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances”); id. at 732 (“The 
Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.”). 
 130. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & 
ECON. 7, 48 (1966) (highlighting the judicial responsibility and “awesome task” of 
applying the Sherman Act in light of the judge’s understanding of both current 
economic theories and “requirements of the judicial process”); Alan J. Meese, Price 
Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 90–91 (2003) 
(explaining how Standard Oil’s Rule of Reason requires courts to evaluate restraints in 
light of evolving economic theory); id. at 141–44 (describing evolution of various 
antitrust doctrines as translations); see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the 
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 802–04 (1965) (stating 
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test, the Court has seemingly embraced the translation methodology 
that informs Standard Oil’s Rule of Reason.131 
No Supreme Court opinion has performed a comprehensive 
assessment of the original public meaning of the term “restraint of . . . 
commerce among the several States” and thus the reach of the statute 
vis-á-vis intrastate restraints.132 Scholarly commentary on the question 
is incomplete.133 The balance of this Article fills this void, conducting 
a de novo assessment of the phrase’s meaning using conventional tools 
of statutory construction—namely, the plain meaning of the text, 
informed by canons of construction. This assessment, in turn, facilitates 
evaluation of the Court’s three-fold explanation for its substitution of 
the substantial effects test for the direct/indirect standard. The 
assessment of the statute’s original meaning begins with an exposition 
of the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the backdrop 
of the congressional debate that preceded enactment of the Sherman 
Act. This jurisprudence, it will be seen, sheds important light on the 
original meaning of the Act. 
                                               
that Standard Oil required courts to “perform[] economic analysis to determine in 
which acts and agreements the evils of monopoly were present”); Lessig, supra note 
124, at 1247–50 (same). 
 131. See Meese, supra note 130, at 91–92 (explaining how modern courts have 
adjusted antitrust doctrine in light of evolving economic theory). 
 132. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, the Court examined whether 
the original meaning of “commerce” included “insurance.” See 322 U.S. 533, 538–39, 
545–53 (1944). The Court (properly) assumed that the challenged agreements 
“restrained” the insurance trade “among the several States” and thus did not examine 
the meaning of these two phrases. See id. at 553. 
 133. For instance, two scholars make the normative case that the Act should only 
reach conduct producing harm in a geographic market exceeding one state’s 
boundaries. See Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 446–49. They also reject the 
direct/indirect test as such. See id. at 445. They do not, however, employ conventional 
tools of statutory construction to assess the original meaning of “in restraint of . . . 
commerce among the several States” or answer the Court’s justifications for the 
substantial effects test. They do discuss statements by Senator Sherman as probative 
regarding the meaning of the statute. See id. at 450–51; cf. infra Part VI (discussing the 
legislative history of the Act). Another scholar defends the current regime without 
engaging the canons of construction and other sources of meaning identified here. 
See generally Gavil, supra note 122. 
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IV.    THE COMMERCE POWER IN 1890 
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States.”134 Gibbons v. Ogden135 offered the foundational 
account of the clause’s meaning.136 Gibbons defined “commerce” to include 
“the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all 
its branches.”137 Such intercourse included navigation as well as “traffic,” 
“buying and selling,” and “the interchange of commodities.”138 The power 
to “regulate” such commerce entailed the power “to prescribe the rule by 
which commerce is to be governed.”139 
Gibbons also rejected claims that the Commerce Clause empowered 
Congress to regulate commerce confined to one state.140 “The genius 
and character of the whole government,” as well as the language of the 
clause, established that Congress could regulate “all the external concerns 
of the nation,” along with “those internal concerns which affect the States 
generally,” but could not govern “those which are completely within a 
particular State [and] which do not affect other States.”141 Empowering 
Congress to regulate intrastate commerce, the Court said, would be 
“inconvenient” and was “certainly unnecessary.”142 Thus, “[t]he completely 
internal” commerce of the state, “carried on between man and man in a 
State . . . . [, was] reserved for the State itself.”143 
Subsequent decisions elaborated on the rationale for the allocation 
of authority prescribed by Gibbons, articulating an anti-favoritism 
principle informing the Commerce Clause and thus the boundary 
between state and national power. Before the Constitution, the Court 
said, interstate commerce was in an “oppressed and degraded state,” 
because of a “helpless, inadequate Confederation.”144 The Framers and 
                                               
 134. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 135. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 136. Canonical decisions treat Gibbons as a definitive exposition of the Commerce 
Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251, 253–55 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111,120, 122 (1942); Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 
351 (1914). 
 137. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189–90. 
 138. Id. at 189. 
 139. Id. at 196. 
 140. Id. at 194–95 (evaluating this argument). 
 141. Id. at 195. 
 142. Id. at 194. 
 143. Id. at 194–95. 
 144. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439–40 (1879); see Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 
275, 280 (1875) (referring to the poor economic conditions under the Articles of 
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Ratifiers abandoned the Confederation, the Court said, and instituted 
a national government “with full power over the entire subject of 
[interstate] commerce.”145 The Commerce Clause ensured “a perfect 
equality amongst the several States as to commercial rights, and . . . 
prevent[ed] unjust and invidious distinctions, which local jealousies or local 
and partial interests might be disposed to introduce and maintain.”146 The 
clause prevented states from “accomplish[ing], by indirection, what the 
State could not accomplish by a direct tax, viz., build[ing] up its domestic 
commerce by means of unequal and oppressive burdens upon the industry 
and business of other States.”147 This oft-cited rationale148 implied that 
the object of the clause was to authorize Congress to preempt partial 
state legislation that burdened interstate trade and enriched one state’s 
                                               
Confederation that induced adoption of the Constitution); State Tonnage Tax Cases, 
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 214 (1870) (“Prior to the adoption of the Constitution the 
States attempted to regulate commerce . . . and it was the embarrassments growing out 
of such regulations and conflicting obligations which mainly led to the abandonment 
of the Confederation and to the more perfect union . . . .”); Brown v. Maryland, 25 
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The oppressed and degraded state 
of commerce previous to the adoption of the constitution can scarcely be forgotten.”); 
see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 224 (Johnson, J., concurring) (noting that states’ 
pursuit of self-interest “began to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic measures, 
from which grew up a conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony 
of the States”); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1054 (Hiliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (“The oppressed and degraded state of 
commerce . . . [under the Confederation] can scarcely be forgotten. . . . Those[] who 
felt the injury . . . perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important 
subject to a single government.”); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the 
Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 598–601 (1994) 
(describing how states imposed export and import taxes to the detriment of other 
states during this era). 
 145. Guy, 100 U.S. at 440. 
 146. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852). 
 147. Guy, 100 U.S. at 443. 
 148. Id. at 442 (explaining that the Commerce Clause preempts “local regulations, 
having for their object to secure exclusive benefits to the citizens and products of 
particular States”); see, e.g., County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880) 
(asserting that Commerce Clause doctrine provides “security against conflicting 
regulations of different States, each discriminating in favor of its own products and 
citizens, and against the products and citizens of other States”); S.S. Co. v. 
Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 33 (1867) (same); Veazie, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 574; 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 231 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“[The] object riding over 
every other in the adoption of the constitution . . . was to keep the commercial 
intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.”); id. at 225 
(discussing how under the Confederation “interference of partial and separate 
regulations” led to “animosities . . . among the several States”). 
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citizens at the expense of others.149 Gibbons itself sustained a federal statute 
preempting New York’s grant of a monopoly over navigation between 
New Jersey and New York that favored New York producers over New 
Jersey consumers.150 
This anti-favoritism rationale also implied limits on the clause’s reach. 
Regulation of intrastate commerce producing no out-of-state harm could 
not be “partial,” discriminate against another state’s citizens, or protect a 
state’s industries from out-of-state competition. To quote Gibbons, federal 
authority over such local subjects “would be inconvenient, and is certainly 
unnecessary,” presumably because states possessed appropriate incentives 
to regulate such conduct.151 
Gibbons also suggested that the commerce power was exclusive within 
portions of its domain and thus would invalidate state obstructions to 
interstate commerce, even absent congressional legislation.152 The 
Court implemented this dicta in 1851, spawning what modern courts 
call the “dormant Commerce Clause.”153 Without employing the term 
“dormant Commerce Clause,” the Court constructed a doctrine of 
implied preemption, invalidating most state regulations of interstate 
commerce even absent any congressional action.154 
The Court divided interstate commerce into two “subjects.”155 Some were 
“national in their character” and/or demanded a uniform system of 
national regulation.156 Others, while connected to interstate commerce and 
thus within Congress’s power, were nonetheless “local” or “mere aids to 
commerce,” and were best suited to decentralized regulation by individual 
                                               
 149. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1101–02 (explaining that this jurisprudence 
rested on a “free-trade” construction of the Commerce Clause). 
 150. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210–15. 
 151. Id. at 194. 
 152. See id. at 198–200. 
 153. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Cushman, 
supra note 20, at 1102, 1107–20. The phrase “dormant Commerce Clause” first 
appeared in a dissenting opinion in 1945. See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 
538, 547 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Previously, the Court had occasionally 
referred to the commerce power as “dormant,” without referencing a “dormant 
Commerce Clause.” See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
245, 252 (1829) (referring to “the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state”). 
 154. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 325 (1851) (explaining 
that Commerce Clause ipso facto invalidated some state regulation). 
 155. Cushman, supra note 20, at 1110–12, 1110 n.104. 
 156. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880) (explaining that the 
subjects of Commerce Clause regulation require “different plans or modes of 
treatment”); Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318–20. 
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states better attuned to the “special circumstances and localities” of the 
subject.157 
The result was a quasi-statutory regime that employed two default 
rules to discern the implied will of Congress. Where a subject was 
national in character or demanded uniform regulation, the Court read 
congressional silence as equivalent to legislation preempting state statutes 
that “regulated” such subjects, because such legislation exercised a power 
exclusively granted to Congress.158 The result, the Court said, was “perfect 
freedom of commercial intercourse between the several States,”159 “liberty 
of trade,”160 and “free and untrammelled” interstate commerce.161 State 
regulation was “repugnant to such freedom,” which remained the default 
status unless Congress authorized interference with interstate commerce.162 
Where, however, a subject did not demand national regulation but 
nonetheless fell within the commerce power, state and national power 
were coextensive. This category had a “limited scope.”163 By default, 
states could regulate such subjects absent congressional legislation, 
                                               
 157. Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697; Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319–20 (stating that 
regulation of harbor pilotage must take diverse forms to “meet the local necessities of 
navigation”). 
 158. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109–10 (1890) (“Whenever, however, a 
particular power of the general government is one which must necessarily be exercised 
by it, and Congress remains silent, . . . the only legitimate conclusion is that the general 
government intended that power should not be affirmatively exercised, and the action 
of the States cannot be permitted to effect that which would be incompatible with such 
intention. Hence, inasmuch as interstate commerce . . . is national in its character, and 
must be governed by a uniform system, so long as Congress does not pass any law to 
regulate it, or allowing the States so to do, it thereby indicates its will that such 
commerce shall be free and untrammelled.”); Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 
465, 482 (1888) (same); see also Cushman, supra note 20, at 1101–11 (discussing 
additional cases). 
 159. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 350–51 (1880) (invalidating tax on reselling 
goods imported from other states). 
 160. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 498 (characterizing state laws that impermissibly regulate 
interstate commerce as “a breach and interruption of that liberty of trade which 
[C]ongress ordains as the national policy”). 
 161. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875); see also Brown v. Houston, 114 
U.S. 622, 631 (1885) (holding that Congressional silence established that interstate 
commerce should be “free and untrammelled” from challenged state tax). 
 162. See Bowman, 125 U.S. at 495. 
 163. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1115; infra notes 318–27 and accompanying text 
(describing Addyston Pipe’s determination that direct restraints of interstate commerce 
were an inherently national subject reserved for Congress). 
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provided such state legislation did not also regulate other subjects of 
interstate commerce that were inherently national.164 
The Court defined as “national in [their] character,” the subjects of 
“transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities” 
between the states.165 Thus, states could not prevent out-of-state firms 
from selling products via independent retailers or traveling salespeople,166 
tax vendors that sold out-of-state goods,167 regulate rates for interstate 
transportation,168 tax the presence of interstate railroads or sleeping cars 
leased to railroads,169 or require telegraph companies to hand-deliver 
interstate messages.170 Regulation of these subjects presented states 
with opportunities to favor their own citizens at the expense of others. 
Congressional silence resulted in preemption of state regulation of 
these subjects, preventing self-interested, partial legislation.171 By 
contrast, local subjects characterized by overlapping jurisdiction 
included harbors, buoys, bridges, or pilotage.172 
By 1875, then, potential subjects of commercial regulation fell into 
three categories: (1) intrastate commerce beyond Congress’s authority 
and thus subject to exclusive state regulation; (2) interstate commerce 
that was inherently national or required a uniform system of regulation 
                                               
 164. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–20 (1851) (describing 
coextensive state and federal power over such subjects). 
 165. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 
U.S. 123, 126 (1880). 
 166. Welton, 91 U.S. at 282 (invalidating tax on traveling vendors selling out-of-state 
products because “the main object of [interstate] commerce is the sale and exchange 
of [interstate] commodities”). 
 167. See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498 (1887) 
(invalidating tax on dealers representing out-of-state manufacturers); Webber v. 
Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 350 (1880) (same); see also Charles W. McCurdy, American Law 
and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 638 
(1978). Professor Barry Cushman collects numerous decisions invalidating state 
regulation of subjects of “national character” in his excellent work Formalism and 
Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000), from which I 
have taken most of these pre-1890 examples. 
 168. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 561–63 (1886). 
 169. See Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114, 117–18 (1890); Pickard v. 
Pullman S. Car Co., 117 U.S. 34, 44, 46 (1886). 
 170. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 358 (1887). 
 171. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text (explaining the anti-favoritism 
rationale of the Commerce Clause). 
 172. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696–99 (1880) (rejecting 
Commerce Clause challenge to state harbor dredging); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 
U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–21 (1851) (rejecting challenge to pilotage fees). 
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and thus subject exclusively to congressional regulation; and (3) interstate 
commerce subject to concurrent state and federal regulation. This body of 
Commerce Clause doctrine later became known as “dual federalism.”173 
Given the Court’s definitions of “commerce,” “among the several 
States,” and “inherently national,” the boundaries between these three 
categories were reasonably clear.174 Still, some otherwise valid state 
regulation of intrastate activities, while apparently within the first 
category, could also affect interstate commerce, raising the possibility 
under Gibbons that such statutes also regulated inherently national 
subjects and thus fell into the second category.175 Implementation of 
dual federalism required the Court to determine whether such effects 
constituted “regulation” of an inherently national subject. This, in 
turn, required the Court to determine the affirmative scope of the 
commerce power (i.e., the power to “regulate”) over intrastate activities 
that affected interstate commerce and the resulting boundary between 
state and federal authority. 
There was, however, little express federal commercial regulation 
during this era. Nearly all decisions opining on the scope of Congress’s 
authority involved challenges to state legislation that allegedly regulated 
subjects of interstate commerce.176 Moreover, independent territorial 
limitations on state authority prevented states from regulating activities 
beyond their borders.177 Thus, most such challenges consisted of claims 
that otherwise permissible regulation of intrastate activity nonetheless 
also regulated inherently national subjects of interstate commerce.178 
Resolution of such claims required the Court to ascertain whether 
Congress had authority over the subject and, if so, whether the 
                                               
 173. See Edward S. Corwin, Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce—A Crucial 
Constitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 477, 481 (1933) (coining this phrase). 
 174. No one doubted, for instance, that state regulation of interstate railway 
transportation was invalid. 
 175. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (opining that Commerce 
Clause empowered Congress to regulate where commerce “affect[ed] other States”). 
 176. In addition to Gibbons, another exception was the Trade-Mark Cases, which held 
that Congress lacked authority to regulate trademarks used only in intrastate 
commerce. 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879). 
 177. See James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1509, 1516–19 (2008) (“Every significant attribute of legislative power available 
to states was territorially circumscribed [in the mid-late nineteenth century.]”). 
 178. Cf. Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) (“[S]tate 
legislation, however legitimate in its origin or object, when it conflicts with the positive 
legislation of [C]ongress, or its intention, reasonably implied from its silence, in 
respect to the subject of [interstate] commerce . . . must fail.” (emphasis added)). 
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challenged legislation in fact “regulated” this subject, exercising 
authority exclusively held by Congress. 
The Court recognized that various intrastate activities affected 
interstate commerce.179 Still, so long as the impact of these activities—
and state regulation thereof—upon interstate commerce was “indirect,” 
such laws did not “regulate” interstate commerce “in the constitutional 
sense,”180 and the activities were beyond congressional power.181 Where, 
however, such intrastate activity or the regulation thereof affected an 
inherently national subject of interstate commerce directly, the 
legislation regulated a subject exclusively reserved to Congress and was 
thus implicitly preempted.182 This jurisprudence was no exercise in 
                                               
 179. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1888) (recognizing that a ban on 
manufacturing reduced interstate commerce); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 481–
82 (1888) (intrastate locomotive operation); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876) 
(grain storage fees). 
 180. R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878). 
 181. See, e.g., Kidd, 128 U.S. at 23 (quoting Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487, 488 
(1878)) (“‘[State] legislation . . . may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and 
persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the 
Constitution,’ unless . . . it ‘imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce,’ or 
‘interferes directly with its freedom.’”); Smith, 124 U.S. at 482 (regulation of 
qualifications of state’s locomotive engineers did not regulate interstate commerce 
because it affected commerce “only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely, and not so 
as to burden or impede [it]”); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1876) 
(explaining that Congress could only preempt state laws that “operated directly upon 
[interstate] commerce”); id. at 103 (“General legislation of this kind . . . is not open to 
any valid objection because it may affect persons engaged in foreign or inter-State 
commerce.”). At least one New Deal scholar claimed that the Court’s pre-1890 
jurisprudence recognized co-extensive state and federal authority over conduct that 
indirectly affected interstate commerce. See supra note 116. However, decisions such as 
Kidd depended upon the assumption that Congress lacked authority over such 
conduct. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1121–24 (describing Kidd’s rationale); id. at 
1117 (describing conduct that Congress could not reach despite indirect impact on 
interstate commerce). Moreover, even if language in Kidd and similar decisions was 
technically dicta confirmed by E.C. Knight, it is still possible that Congress meant to 
embrace that dicta as its own understanding of the scope of the commerce power and 
thus the Sherman Act. See infra notes 449–63, 478 and accompanying text (recounting 
invocation of Commerce Clause decisions by Senators debating early versions of the 
Act). 
 182. See Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating facially-neutral 
meat inspection regime that “directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of animals, 
whose meat is to be sold [by out-of-state firms] in Minnesota for human food”); 
Sherlock, 93 U.S. at 102–03 (explaining that the Court would invalidate state regulation 
as contrary to the Commerce Clause where “legislation created, in the way of tax, 
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arid formalism183 but instead implemented the anti-favoritism principle 
the Court believed animated the Commerce Clause, condemning 
“partial legislation” that favored a state’s own products and citizens over 
those of other states.184 
This case law, consistent with the Court’s account of the clause’s 
rationale, allocated legislative authority based upon the existence (or 
not) of what economists would call “interstate economic spillover[s].”185 
States retained authority over a category of conduct whenever they 
internalized the full harms and benefits of legislation over that 
subject.186 This category, which exceeded Congress’s reach, included 
activities that produced incidental but harmless impacts on other 
states.187 Thus, a regime of competitive federalism generated the rules 
governing activities that produced no harmful interstate externalities. 
Presumably such competition between sovereigns produced legal rules 
superior to those a centralized unitary regime would have produced.188 
                                               
license, or condition, a direct burden upon commerce, or in some way directly 
interfered with its freedom”). 
 183. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1091–93 (identifying scholars making this 
argument). 
 184. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880) (explaining the need 
for congressional power to regulate commerce among the states because the states 
would otherwise enact laws benefitting their own citizens at the expense of others). 
 185. See Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 405–06 (applying the anti-spillover 
rationale to advocate a similar approach to Sherman Act jurisdiction); Richard A. 
Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 12–14 (1987) 
(explaining that the Commerce Clause empowers “Congress to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce and thus to prevent states from imposing harmful externalities on 
other states and to internalize beneficial externalities”). 
 186. See Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 437, 439 (1879) (describing the limits on 
state authority); Hall, 95 U.S. at 487–88 (noting that states possess exclusive authority 
over common carriers operating solely within their borders); State Tonnage Tax Cases, 
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 214 (1870) (explaining that states retain authority over 
commerce that is “completely internal and which does not extend to or affect other 
States”); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 573–75 (1852) (same); Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (same). 
   187. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 188. Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 937 (“There is a powerful tendency toward 
optimal legislation to the extent four conditions hold: (1) people and resources are 
mobile; (2) the number of jurisdictions is substantial (no monopoly or oligopoly 
power); (3) jurisdictions can select any set of laws they desire; and (4) all of the 
consequences of one jurisdiction’s laws are felt by people who live in or consent to that 
jurisdiction (in other words, no third party effects, often called externalities).”); see also 
Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 89, 89 (2012) (stating that “robust interjurisdictional competition facilitates the 
enactment of better public policy at the state level,” but only when states cannot 
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Where states did not fully internalize the harms and benefits of an 
activity, the Court’s jurisprudence allocated (exclusive) authority to 
Congress.189 Thus, the Constitution “confide[d]” in Congress exclusive 
authority over interstate railway rates and intrastate rates that directly 
affected interstate rates because Congress’s “enlarged view of the 
interests of all the States, and of the railroads concerned, better fits it 
to establish just and equitable rules.”190 Such regulation, the Court said, 
must be “of a general and national character, and cannot be safely and 
wisely remitted to local rules and local regulations.”191 State regulation 
of such rates necessarily produced extraterritorial harms and freeriding 
on other states’ regulatory choices.192 The Commerce Clause thereby 
prevented a race to the bottom and resulting suboptimal legislation with 
respect to rules governing interstate commerce, while harnessing the 
benefits of competition between the states with respect to intrastate 
activity.193 The result was a “free-trade network,” with the Supreme 
Court acting as an “umpire” invalidating laws that favored one state’s 
citizens over others.194 
The direct/indirect standard was just that—a standard—and thus 
often entailed a fact-intensive assessment of the impact of particular 
                                               
generate externalities); LeBoeuf, supra note 144, at 557–65 (describing advantages of 
decentralized production of legal rules where no externalities are present); Posner, 
supra note 185, at 14 (describing benefits of competition between states absent 
externalities); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416, 422 (1956). Some scholars have applied this logic in the antitrust context. See 
Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 447–49 (describing theory of competitive 
federalism); Easterbrook, supra note 58, at 33–35. See generally Meese, supra note 89. 
 189. See Hall, 95 U.S. at 489 (holding the Commerce Clause prevents states from 
regulating interstate commerce “regardless of the interests of others”); Veazie, 55 U.S. 
(14 How.) at 574 (noting that the Commerce Clause was aimed at combating 
“invidious distinctions” among the states). One scholar has attributed to the Framers 
an identical account of the commerce power, without discussing the Court’s 
jurisprudence. See LeBoeuf, supra note 144, at 607. 
 190. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937 159–64 
(1991). 
 193. See LeBoeuf, supra note 144, at 570–92 (explaining how interstate externalities 
can cause a legislative race to the bottom). 
 194. McCurdy, supra note 167, at 648 (explaining that between 1875 and 1890, the 
Court “monitor[ed] the free-trade unit in the silence of Congress”); see also Cushman, 
supra note 20, at 1107 & n.96 (collecting sources showing that the Court “played a 
critical, instrumental role in opening a national market” by using the Commerce 
Clause to invalidate “parochial legislation”). 
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legislation.195 Application of this standard was presumably susceptible 
to changes in surrounding factual circumstances that influenced 
whether an impact was direct or indirect.196 Indeed, in 1877, the Court 
opined that the power over commerce “keep[s] pace with the progress 
of the country, and adapt[s] [itself] to the new developments of time 
and circumstances.”197 
V.    THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “RESTRAINT OF . . . COMMERCE 
AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES” AND THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts “in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States.”198 The phrase “restraint 
of trade” denotes the Act’s substantive content—i.e., the category of 
agreements that produce the sort of harm the statute condemns.199 
However, agreements that produce such harm only offend section 1 if 
they also restrain “commerce among the several States.”200 The quoted 
phrase allocates authority over harmful agreements between states and 
the nation.201 Drawing on Part IV’s exposition of pre-1890 Commerce 
                                               
 195. See Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating meat 
inspection regime despite facial neutrality and plausible police power purpose after a 
fact-intensive determination that the regime’s “necessary operation . . . directly” 
burdened interstate commerce); Wabash, 118 U.S. at 571 (“The line which separates 
the powers of the States from this exclusive power of Congress is not always distinctly 
marked, and oftentimes . . . . it would be a useless task to . . . fix an arbitrary rule . . . . 
It is far better to leave a matter of such delicacy to be settled in each case upon a view 
of the particular rights involved.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992) 
(distinguishing legal standards from rules and explaining that standards entail “direct 
application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation” and “allow the 
decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the 
circumstances”); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 70 (1911) 
(analogizing the Rule of Reason to judicial application of the direct/indirect 
standard); id. at 60 (concluding that the Sherman Act “indubitably contemplate[ed] 
and requir[ed] a standard” i.e., the Rule of Reason, to determine whether agreements 
restrained trade). 
 196. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 195, at 58–59 (noting that standards do not “tie[] the 
decisionmaker’s hand[s]” as much as rules because “the more facts one may take into 
account, the more likely that some of them will be different the next time”). 
 197. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1878). 
 198. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 199. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51–60. 
 200. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s 
interpretation of the Act as allocating mutually exclusive authority to states and the 
federal government over different types of trade restraints). But see supra notes 69–72, 
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Clause jurisprudence, this Part examines whether the “substantial 
effects” test faithfully implements the original meaning of this limiting 
phrase. In particular, this Part evaluates the Court’s three rationales 
for replacing the direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects 
test: (1) that Congress meant to reach restraints beyond the authority 
implied by pre-1890 dual federalism jurisprudence; (2) that the Act 
properly expands whenever the commerce power expands; and (3) 
that changed economic circumstances justify the new test. 
A.   Did Congress Reject the Court’s Pre-1890 Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence? 
The Supreme Court has sometimes claimed that the 1890 Congress 
rejected pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, hoping instead to 
reach intrastate restraints that indirectly affected interstate commerce.202 
Analysis of this claim about the original meaning of the Act must begin 
with the plain language of the statute: “restraint of . . . commerce 
among the several States.” 
“Among the several States” is clear enough. Since Gibbons, the Court 
has repeatedly equated “among” with “between,” precluding Congress 
from regulating commerce within a state.203 The substantial effects test 
incorporates this assumption, asking as it does whether an intrastate 
restraint affects commerce between two or more states.204 The meaning 
of “restrain,” however, is less obvious. Contemporary dictionaries defined 
“restraint” as “[t]hat which restrains, as a law, prohibition and the like.”205 
These same sources suggest several definitions of “restrain,” including 
“limit,” “hold back,” “check,” “hinder from unlimited enjoyment,” or “curb,” 
perhaps capturing conduct that, while intrastate, nonetheless impacts, 
                                               
88–93 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s adoption of the “substantial 
effects” test, thereby creating a category of restraints over which states and the federal 
government had overlapping jurisdiction). 
 202. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1125. 
 203. See supra notes 136–38, 140 and accompanying text. 
 204. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321–22 (1967) (per curiam). 
   205. See WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1128 
(Chauncey A. Goodrich et al. eds., London, George Bell & Sons 1886) (defining 
“restraint” as “[t]hat which restrains, as a law, a prohibition, and the like; limitation; 
restriction”); see also JAMES STORMONTH, ETYMOLOGICAL AND PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 525 (Edinburgh & London, William Blackwood & Sons 
1882) (defining “restraint” as “the act of restraining; abridgment of liberty; restriction; 
hindrance of will; repression; that which restrains”). 
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“influences,” or “affects” interstate commerce.206 The term could also 
mean “confine,” “restrict,” “bind fast,” “repress,” or “abridge.”207 
Because the plain meaning of “restraint” is ambiguous, courts and 
scholars would next turn to canons of construction.208 Three canons 
recommend themselves here. First, there is the avoidance canon. 
Courts faced with different possible meanings of a statute reject the 
alternative that poses constitutional difficulties.209 The canon rests 
upon the presumption that Congress does not intentionally pass 
legislation that the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional.210 
The Court applied this canon numerous times before 1890.211 
This canon counsels rejection of broader readings of “restraint.” By 
1890, the Court had repeatedly rejected claims that all state regulations 
of intrastate activity affecting interstate commerce thereby “regulated” 
such commerce “in a constitutional sense,” opining that such regulations 
exceeded the scope of the commerce power.212 Instead, the Court said, 
the commerce power only reached state regulations of intrastate activity 
that affected interstate commerce “directly.”213 Thus, reading the 
                                               
 206. See WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 
205, at 1128 (defining “restrain” as “to draw back again; to hold back; to check,” “[t]o 
limit; to confine; to restrict,” and “to hinder from unlimited enjoyment; to abridge.”); 
STORMONTH, supra note 205, at 525 (defining “restrain” as “to hold back; to bind fast; 
to curb; to repress; to limit; to abridge”). 
 207. WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 205, at 
1128; STORMONTH, supra note 205, at 525. 
 208. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
109, 109–10 (2010) (describing how canons facilitate determination of original 
meaning of texts). 
 209. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (describing the avoidance 
canon as “a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a 
statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the 
alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”); United States ex rel. Attorney 
Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible 
of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise 
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”). 
 210. Clark, 543 U.S. at 381. 
 211. See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 269 (1886) (“[A] statute must be 
interpreted so as, if possible, to make it consistent with the Constitution and the 
paramount law.”); Grenada Cty. Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 268–69 (1884) 
(citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 184–85 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Company 1880)) (same). 
 212. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 23 (1888); supra notes 179–81 and 
accompanying text. 
 213. See Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating state police 
regulation directly obstructing interstate commerce); Kidd, 128 U.S. at 23 (quoting 
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Sherman Act to reach intrastate “restraints of trade” simply because 
such agreements—or state regulation of them—also produce a 
“substantial” fortuitous effect on interstate commerce would create “grave 
and doubtful constitutional questions”214 under pre-1890 jurisprudence, 
and thus militates against such a reading. 
The avoidance canon itself offers no affirmative account of statutory 
meaning and thus no alternative to the substantial effects test. However, 
a second canon—the prior construction canon—may provide such an 
account.215 This canon provides that, when Congress employs verbal 
formulations that have obtained meaning in other contexts—including 
interpretation of related texts—courts give statutory terms that pre-
existing meaning, unless context clearly indicates otherwise.216 This 
prior meaning of terms thereby functions as a dictionary, clarifying 
ambiguous statutory language.217 This is merely a manifestation of the 
term of art canon, whereby courts give terms technical meanings they 
have acquired in other contexts, even if such meanings contradict a 
statute’s plain meaning.218 
As Justice Frankfurter put it: 
Words of art bring their art with them. They bear the meaning of 
their habitat whether it be a phrase of technical significance in the 
                                               
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487, 488 (1878)) (asserting that Congress may only 
preempt state regulation affecting commerce that “‘imposes a direct burden upon 
interstate commerce’ or ‘interferes directly with its freedom’”); supra note 182 and 
accompanying text. 
 214. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408. 
 215. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 322–26 (2012) (“If a statute uses words or phrases that have already 
received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction’s court of last resort, or even 
uniform construction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative agency, they 
are to be understood according to that construction.”). 
 216. See Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 395 (1920) (“The law uses familiar 
legal expressions in their familiar legal sense . . . .”). 
 217. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2465 (2003) 
(“Textualism . . . recognizes that Congress may speak in legal shorthand, drawing on 
established legal terms that have been refined through case-by-case application.”); see 
also, e.g., Dir. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 126–27 
(1995) (applying term of art canon in light of prior interpretations of statutory term). 
 218. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 215, at 324 (citation omitted) (explaining that 
when a term has been “authoritatively interpreted by a high court . . . the term bears 
this same meaning[] [because] [t]he term has acquired . . . a technical legal sense that 
should be given effect in the construction of later-enacted statutes”); see id. 
(concluding that this result implements term of art canon); id. at 73–77 (explaining 
how term of art canon facilitates determination of text’s ordinary meaning). 
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scientific or business world, or whether it be loaded with the recondite 
connotations of feudalism . . . . The peculiar idiom of business or of 
administrative practise often modifies the meaning that ordinary 
speech assigns to language. And if a word is obviously transplanted from 
another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it 
brings the old soil with it.219 
Courts have taken exactly this approach when discerning the 
meaning of “restraint of trade.”220 Most notably, in Standard Oil, the 
Court determined that the term had a well-understood meaning in 
statutory law, common law, and constitutional sources as referring only to 
“unreasonable” restraints.221 These same sources supplied the meaning of 
the term “reasonable,” treating as “unreasonable” agreements producing 
monopoly or the results of monopoly.222 These sources supplied a 
dictionary the Court employed to determine the meaning of a statutory 
term of art.223 
This second canon suggests an alternative meaning for the phrase “in 
restraint of . . . commerce among the several States” and a meaning that, 
unlike the substantial effects test, would have passed constitutional 
muster in 1890. The source of meaning is not the common law, but 
instead the case law comprising the pre-1890 quasi-statutory regime 
implementing Congress’s presumed intent vis-á-vis state enactments 
affecting interstate commerce. 
Unlike “commerce” and “among the several States,” the term 
“restraint” does not appear in the Commerce Clause or, for that matter, 
the Constitution itself.224 Nonetheless, one finds hints about the meaning 
of the term in Gibbons and contemporaneous materials. For instance, 
concurring in Gibbons, Justice William Johnson opined that the “one 
object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, . . . was 
to keep commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious 
                                               
 219. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 
527, 537 (1947). 
 220. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406, 408 
(1911) (invoking common law to support conclusion that vertical price fixing 
agreements were “in restraint of trade”); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 
85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (canvassing pre-Sherman Act common law to 
determine section 1’s meaning), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 221. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50–62, 64 (1911). 
 222. Id. at 61–64. 
 223. Standard Oil invoked other considerations as well. See Alan J. Meese, Standard 
Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 784 (2012) (explaining that the 
Court read the Act to avoid banning agreements protected by liberty of contract). 
   224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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and partial restraints.”225 During the same year, President James Monroe 
described the scope of the commerce power, asserting that, under the 
Articles of Confederation, “States individually had commenced a system 
of restraint on each other whereby the interests of foreign powers were 
promoted at their expense.”226 States victimized by such laws, he said, 
immediately placed “[r]estraints . . . on such [interstate] commerce.”227 
One year later, Justice Joseph Story, who had joined Gibbons and 
other Marshall Court Commerce Clause decisions,228 offered a similar 
account of the evils that motivated adoption of the clause.229 Under the 
Articles of Confederation, Justice Story said, states regulated interstate 
and international commerce “under the stimulating influence of local 
interests, and the desire [for] undue gain.”230 Justice Story repeated 
verbatim President Monroe’s assertion that “states individually 
commenced a system of restraint upon each other, whereby the interests 
of foreign powers were promoted at their expense.”231 The “contracted 
policy in some of the states was soon counteracted by others,” Justice 
Story said, and “[r]estraints were immediately laid on such commerce by 
the suffering states; and thus a state of affairs disorderly and unnatural 
grew up, the necessary tendency of which was to destroy the union 
itself.”232 Finally, in the License Cases,233 Chief Justice Taney referred to 
states’ intrastate regulation of alcohol consumption as “regulating and 
restraining the traffic” in such “ardent spirits” but sustained the measure 
because the traffic in question was intrastate.234 
The first three statements equated “restraints” of interstate commerce 
with self-interested state legislation that injured out-of-state citizens, 
producing what Justice Story called “a state of affairs disorderly and 
                                               
 225. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
 226. James Monroe, Special Message to the House of Representatives Containing the Views of 
the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 4, 1822) (emphasis added), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
documents/special-message-the-house-representatives-containing-the-views-the-
president-the-united [https://perma.cc/QH48-3WYG]. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Brown 
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1. 
 229. See 3 STORY, supra note 144, § 1062. 
 230. Id. § 1066. 
 231. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Monroe, supra note 226). 
 232. Id. (emphasis added). 
 233. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). 
 234. Id. at 577. 
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unnatural.”235 The fourth, by Chief Justice Taney, equated “restraint” with 
“regulation.” None equated “restraint” with mere impact on commerce. 
Aside from the opinions of Justice Johnson and Chief Justice Taney, 
these materials may be insufficiently “legal” to satisfy the requirements 
for application of the prior construction canon. However, subsequent 
judicial decisions used the term “restraint” in the very same way. As 
explained earlier, from the 1850s onward, the Court repeatedly held 
that state enactments that “regulated” inherently national subjects of 
interstate commerce contravened Congress’s implied will.236 
Implementation of this quasi-statutory doctrine of implied preemption 
required the Court to discern which state legislation “regulated” these 
subjects of interstate commerce. Decisions conducting this inquiry 
repeatedly emphasized that a mere impact on interstate commerce did 
not constitute “regulation . . . in the constitutional sense.”237 Thus, 
“regulation” was a term of art within this jurisprudence. 
During the 1880s, the Court adjusted this verbal formulation, sometimes 
employing the term “restraint” as synonymous with “regulation.” In Brown 
v. Houston,238 for instance, the Court opined that a law taxing “every 
wagon-load, or car-load . . . brought into [a] city” from other states 
would be “a regulation of, and restraint upon, inter-State commerce” and thus 
“an encroachment upon the exclusive powers of Congress.”239 
Moreover, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois,240 the 
Court declared that the Commerce Clause was intended to secure “the 
right of continuous transportation from one end of the country to the 
other” from “restraints which the State[s] might choose to impose upon 
it.”241 During the same term, in Walling v. Michigan,242 the Court employed 
                                               
 235. 3 STORY, supra note 144, § 1062. 
 236. See, e.g., Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886) (explaining that state 
taxation of products manufactured in other states amounts to a regulation of 
commerce); see also supra notes 158–72 and accompanying text (describing this case law). 
 237. See R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878) (“Many acts of a State may, indeed, 
affect commerce, without amounting to a regulation of it, in the constitutional sense 
of the term.”); supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 238. 114 U.S. 622 (1885). 
 239. Id. at 634 (emphasis added). 
 240. 118 U.S. 557 (1886). 
 241. Id. at 572–73 (emphasis added); see Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 
465, 494 (1888) (quoting this language with approval); see also In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 
560 (1891) (explaining that implied exercise of the commerce power preempts state 
legislation functioning as a “restraint upon that perfect freedom which [Congress’s] 
silence insured”). 
 242. 116 U.S. 446 (1886). 
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a similar formulation, holding that a state’s “discriminating tax . . . 
operating to the disadvantage of the products of other states . . . is, in 
effect, a regulation in restraint of commerce among the states, and as such is 
a usurpation of the [commerce] power.”243 Several inferior courts 
employed the same formulation before and during this period.244 
Shortly before passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court and 
other courts—applying a quasi-statutory regime implementing the 
supposed intent of Congress—had employed the phrase “restraint of 
commerce among the several States” to describe state legislation governing 
intrastate conduct that improperly “regulated” inherently national subjects 
of interstate commerce.245 Such “regulation” contravened Congress’s 
implied will that interstate commerce be “free and untrammelled.”246 
These decisions were not obscure. Wabash, for instance, denied states the 
authority to regulate intrastate railroad rates that directly impacted 
interstate rates, thereby impelling creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.247 These decisions echoed previous similar usages of the 
                                               
 243. Id. at 455 (emphasis added). 
 244. See Lang v. Lynch, 38 F. 489, 490 (C.C.D.N.H. 1889) (describing plaintiff’s 
argument that “the statute is unconstitutional[] because it is a regulation in restraint 
of commerce between the states”); Indiana ex rel. Wolf v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 16 
F. 193, 199 (C.C.D. Ind. 1883) (invalidating state tax on out-of-state railroads because 
the tax “amounts to a restraint or regulation of commerce between the states”); Phila. 
& Havre de Grace Steam Tow-Boat Co. v. Phila., Wilmington & Balt. R.R., 19 F. Cas. 
474, 476 (D. Md. 1856) (No. 11,085) (explaining that “no act of a state, which in any 
way would seek to regulate, restrain or limit” interstate commerce can pass 
constitutional muster unless enacted or sanctioned by Congress); People v. Raymond, 
34 Cal. 492, 499–501 (1868) (invalidating state tax on carriage of passengers as a 
“regulation of commerce” because “[i]ts undeniable tendency is to restrain 
intercourse with foreign nations”); McGuire v. State, 42 Ohio St. 530, 532 (1885) 
(rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to state alcohol regulation because “[i]t [did] 
not seek to regulate or restrain the traffic in wine or any other specific property, as an 
article of import or export”); id. at 534 (“This exclusive power to regulate commerce, 
has reference to burdens or restraints imposed directly on the articles themselves . . . 
.”); see also Lafarier v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Can., 24 A. 848, 850 (Me. 1892) (invalidating 
legislation because it imposed a “meddlesome interference and restraint” on railroads 
and thus improperly regulated interstate commerce). 
 245. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s definition of commerce). 
 246. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: 
An Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2161, 2171 (2015) (“Congress filled 
the regulatory vacuum left by Wabash by passing the Interstate Commerce Act[, Pub. 
L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887),] in 1887.”). 
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term “restraint” by one President and three Supreme Court Justices.248 
Thus, the term “restraint of . . . commerce” had received a previous 
construction in a quasi-statutory body of law closely related to the 
subject of the Sherman Act—regulation of interstate commerce. 
When it chose the phrase “in restraint of . . . commerce among the 
several States,” to define the category of agreements “in restraint of 
trade” that were also subject to the Act, Congress “transplanted [this 
phrase] from another legal source”: namely, the Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.249 The phrase thus brought “old soil with it.”250 This 
“soil” presumably included the judicial standards distinguishing state 
enactments that impermissibly “regulated” or “restrained” interstate 
commerce from those that “affected” such commerce without “regulating” 
it “in a constitutional sense.”251 As Justice Jackson put it when explaining 
the rationale for this canon: 
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the 
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably 
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and 
the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise 
instructed.252 
By adopting this legal formula in a definition of private agreements, 
Congress presumably incorporated a distinction, well-known to the 
“judicial mind,” between intrastate agreements that “directly” affected 
interstate commerce and those that merely affected such commerce 
“indirectly.”253 Only the former constituted impermissible regulations and 
thus “restraints” of interstate commerce under section 1.254 The latter, 
                                               
 248. See supra notes 225–34 and accompanying text (discussing pre-1850 sources 
equating “restrain” with “regulate”). 
 249. See Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 537; cf. Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and 
Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2013, 2039–44 (2017) (canvassing some 
of this evidence and taking a similar approach to discerning the meaning of “restraint 
of trade” and thus the substantive content of the Act). 
 250. Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 537. 
 251. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing decisions holding that 
implied exercise of the commerce power preempted state statutes that “regulated” 
interstate commerce). 
 252. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). 
 253. See supra notes 179–87 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s 
repeated invocation of the direct/indirect distinction in its pre-1890 Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence). 
 254. Proponents of the modern approach might object that this second canon 
replicates the avoidance canon, given this canon’s reliance upon Commerce Clause 
precedent. However, application of the second canon does not turn on the source of 
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even if “in restraint of trade,” did not impact interstate commerce in a 
way that constituted regulation “in a constitutional sense.”255 This 
meaning precludes application of the Act to intrastate restraints that 
merely produce a (fortuitous) substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
The resulting allocation of regulatory authority would reflect the 
anti-favoritism principle that informed the Court’s overall distribution 
of regulatory power between state and federal sovereigns.256 Thus, 
states would retain exclusive authority over those restraints with 
respect to which they internalized the costs and benefits of their 
regulatory decisions, with competitive federalism generating doctrine 
governing such restraints. However, the national government would 
retain authority over restraints that threatened interstate harm and 
thus raised the prospect that state regulation of such contracts would 
produce self-interested or “partial” results, favoring the state’s citizens 
at the expense of others.257 
The third canon, contemporaneous judicial construction, also sheds 
additional light on the meaning of “restraint of . . . Commerce.” The 
Supreme Court has treated near-contemporaneous post-enactment 
constructions of a legal text as pertinent indications of meaning.258 The 
rationale for this canon is straightforward: judges sharing the legal 
culture of the authors of a text are more likely to understand that text’s 
meaning than those seeking that meaning decades later. While courts 
should accord such precedents respect under the doctrine of stare 
decisis, these contemporaneous constructions are also independently 
probative evidence of the text’s original meaning. 
The Court had several occasions shortly after 1890 to determine 
when intrastate agreements were “in restraint of . . . commerce among 
                                               
the verbal formulation Congress has borrowed. Thus, the same results would obtain if 
the phrase “restraint of . . . commerce among the several States” had appeared in 
decisions interpreting a previous federal statute. 
 255. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text (explaining the role that the 
anti-favoritism principle played in the Court’s allocation of power between the states 
and the federal government when implementing the Commerce Clause). 
 257. See infra notes 318–38 and accompanying text (describing Addyston Pipe’s 
similar rationale for applying Act to direct restraints of interstate commerce). 
 258. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 610–14 (2008) (treating 
post-enactment judicial constructions as probative evidence of constitutional 
meaning); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 982, 985 (1991) (same); see also Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins., 127 U.S. 
265, 297 (1888)) (explaining that contemporaneous construction of the Constitution 
by the First Congress is “weighty evidence of its true meaning”). 
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the several States.” First and most famously came United States v. E.C. 
Knight Co., which involved a merger creating a Pennsylvania-based 
monopoly in the national sugar market.259 The lead defendant’s corporate 
charter stated that the firm was formed “for the purpose of importing, 
manufacturing, refining and dealing in sugars and molasses.”260 Another 
defendant, incorporated in New Jersey, acquired E.C. Knight and 
other firms, the United States said, “to prevent and counteract the 
effect of free competition” and “exact and procure large sums of 
money from the citizens of Pennsylvania and from the citizens of 
several States of the United States.”261 
The Court conceded that the transaction could be “in restraint of 
trade,” and thus invalid under state law.262 The Court acknowledged 
that such a monopolistic restraint could impact both domestic and 
interstate trade, because the newly-created firm would export sugar to 
out-of-state purchasers.263 But did the merger restrain “commerce 
among the several States?” 
To answer this question, the Court referred to its pre-1890 Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, invoking decisions evaluating challenges to state 
regulation of intrastate activity.264 These decisions established that such 
an impact did not justify an affirmative exercise of the commerce 
                                               
 259. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 2 (1895). 
 260. See Bill of Complaint at 3, United States v. E.C. Knight & Co., 60 F. 306 (E.D. 
Pa. 1892) (No. 38). 
 261. Id. at 7–8. 
 262. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16. 
 263. Id. at 12 (“[T]he power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in 
a certain sense the control of its disposition . . . .”). 
 264. Id. at 13–15 (discussing Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Coe v. Errol, 116 
U.S. 517 (1886); and Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1852)). Neither Coe nor 
Veazie expressly invoked the direct/indirect distinction, but other pre-Sherman Act 
decisions did. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating 
legislation directly restricting commerce in slaughtered animals); Smith v. Alabama, 
124 U.S. 465, 473 (1888) (reviewing legislation requiring locomotive engineers to have 
an Alabama license); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1878) (holding legislation 
that acts upon business as it enters or leaves the state is a direct restraint); Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876) (holding that Illinois’s law setting maximum 
warehouse fees did not directly encroach upon Congress’s commerce power); 
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102–04 (1876) (holding that state’s imposition of tort 
liability for accident occuring in state’s territorial waters did not directly burden 
interstate commerce). Kidd, it should be noted, invoked Hall, Sherlock, Munn, and 
Gibbons for the proposition that state police regulations only ran afoul of the 
Commerce Clause if they affected interstate commerce directly. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 23. 
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power.265 Citing Gibbons, the Court noted that state laws it invalidated under 
the Commerce Clause had “direct[ly] interfere[d]” with, and thus “regulated,” 
interstate commerce.266 These restrictions of production, whether by state 
legislation or private agreement, merely affected such commerce in “a 
secondary[,] and not the primary[,] sense . . . only incidentally and indirectly” 
and thus did not “regulate” interstate commerce.267 
The Sherman Act “was framed” with these “well-settled principles” in 
mind.268 Congress did not seek to reach monopoly as such, recognizing 
that intrastate production restraints merely impacted interstate 
commerce indirectly and fell exclusively to the states.269 The 
indictment in E.C. Knight alleged acts “related exclusively to the 
acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries and the business of sugar 
refining in Pennsylvania, and bore no direct relation to commerce 
between the States.”270 There was no allegation that the defendants 
intended to restrain interstate commerce.271 Thus, the Court implicitly 
rejected the modern claim that Congress believed it possessed coextensive 
authority over agreements that indirectly affected interstate commerce.272 
Instead, the Court said, Congress embraced the direct/indirect standard 
as defining the mutually exclusive boundary between state and federal 
power.273 While Justice Harlan dissented, he embraced the direct/indirect 
formulation but concluded that the merger would “directly affect” 
interstate commerce.274 
                                               
 265. See E.C Knight, 156 U.S. at 13–15 (discussing pre-1890 Commerce Clause 
decisions). 
 266. Id. at 15–16 (“In Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown v. Maryland, and other cases often 
cited, the state laws [invalidated] were instances of direct interference with or 
regulations of interstate or international commerce . . . .”). 
 267. See id. at 12, 16 (invoking Kidd for the proposition that banning manufacturing 
within a state’s borders would “not . . . directly affect external commerce,” and that 
“state legislation which, in a great variety of ways, affected interstate commerce . . . has 
been frequently sustained because the interference was not direct”). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. (holding that Congress did not intend to reach the mere possession of a 
monopoly by manufacturing corporations). 
 270. Id. at 17 (“The object was manifestly private gain in the manufacture of the 
commodity, but not through the control of interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (describing this contention). 
 273. See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17 (demonstrating Congress’s presumed adoption 
of the direct/indirect standard to govern the scope of the Sherman Act). 
 274. Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that the transaction “affects, not 
incidentally, but directly, the people of all the States”). 
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The Court reiterated this approach four times before 1900. These 
opinions also articulated a tractable methodology for distinguishing 
direct from indirect restraints, defining as “direct” those restraints that 
exercised market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers. In 
Hopkins v. United States,275 for instance, the government challenged 
certain bylaws of a Kansas City livestock exchange.276 Members of the 
livestock exchange accepted cattle on consignment from farmers in 
various states, resold such livestock to local purchasers, and remitted 
net proceeds to the original owners.277 One bylaw fixed members’ 
commissions and prohibited dealings with non-members.278 Another set 
the salary of agents that solicited these consignments and prohibited 
members from transmitting market prices to potential consignors.279 
The Court unanimously rejected the challenge, again invoking the 
direct/indirect distinction.280 Charges for the interstate transportation 
of cattle would directly burden interstate commerce.281 However, 
charges for selling such cattle on the exchange were not “directly 
connected with” or “part of” such commerce.282 The Court acknowledged 
that agreements setting local commissions might increase “the cost of 
conducting an interstate commercial business.”283 Invocation of the 
statute based on such “indirect and incidental” impacts would, 
however, “enlarge application of the act far beyond the fair meaning 
of the language used.”284 Instead, “[t]here must be some direct and 
immediate effect upon interstate commerce in order to come within 
                                               
 275. 171 U.S. 578 (1898). 
 276. Id. at 579. 
 277. Id. at 582. 
 278. Id. at 581. 
 279. Id. at 581–82. 
 280. Id. at 597 (invoking United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), 
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 
U.S. 196 (1885), County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1880), and Welton v. 
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875), as exemplifying relevant Commerce Clause principles); 
see also id. (“But in all the cases which have come to this court there is not one which 
has denied the distinction between a regulation which directly affects and embarrasses 
interstate trade or commerce, and one which is nothing more than a charge for a local 
facility provided for the transaction of such commerce.”). 
 281. Id. at 590–91. 
 282. Id. (distinguishing defendants’ commissions from “charges which are directly 
laid upon the article in the course of transportation, and which are charges upon the 
commerce itself”). 
 283. Id. at 592. 
 284. Id. at 587, 592. 
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the act.”285 The Court analogized private agreements potentially governed 
by the Sherman Act to state legislation affecting commerce: “An 
agreement may in a variety of ways affect interstate commerce, just as state 
legislation may, and yet, like it, be entirely valid, because the interference 
produced by the agreement or by the legislation is not direct.”286 
To illustrate the difference between direct and indirect impacts, the 
Court cited E.C Knight, along with decisions evaluating state-imposed 
fees on local facilities for compliance with the Commerce Clause.287 
While the challenged agreement certainly “enhance[d] the expense to 
those engaged in the business,” this effect on interstate commerce 
was—like the effect of fees on local facilities—“indirect,” and thus the 
contract was “not illegal as a restraint thereon.”288 Only “exorbitant 
[local] charges,” the Court said, would sufficiently affect commerce 
and justify application of the Act.289 Indeed, subsequent decisions read 
Hopkins as holding that the agreement would have violated the Act as 
a direct restraint if it had produced unreasonable charges.290 
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n291 reflected the same approach. 
Defendant railroad companies collusively set rates for interstate traffic 
and claimed that, if reasonable, such rates did not offend the Act.292 
                                               
 285. Id. at 592. 
 286. Id. at 594 (emphasis added). 
 287. Id. (citing Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); United States v. E.C. Knight 
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U.S. 590 (1895); Transp. 
Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882); and Ficklen v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist., 145 U.S. 
1 (1892)), see also id. at 592 (citing Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S. 
288 (1887); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); and Ky. 
& Ind. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 37 F. 567 (C.C.D. Ky. 1889)). 
 288. See id. at 596. 
 289. Id. at 595–96 (“It is possible that exorbitant charges for the use of these 
facilities might have similar effect as . . . a charge upon commerce itself might have. In 
a case like that the remedy would probably be forthcoming.”); id. at 594 (citing N.Y., 
Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431 (1895) (rejecting Commerce Clause 
challenge to tax upon tolls charged for use of Pennsylvania tracks)) (“As their effect is 
either indirect or else they relate to charges for the use of facilities furnished, the 
agreements instanced would be valid provided the charges agreed upon were 
reasonable. The effect upon the commerce spoken of must be direct and proximate.”). 
 290. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 525 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United 
States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905) (concluding that Hopkins “left open” validity of 
restraints producing “exorbitant charges”); see also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE 
NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 145–46 (1998) 
(concluding that local state or private measures imposing supracompetitive prices on 
interstate commerce were deemed “direct” restraints during this period). 
 291. 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
 292. Id. at 562 (describing the agreement). 
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They also raised a more fundamental challenge, contending that the 
Act, as construed in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,293 
banned “ordinary contracts and combinations,” that were “at the same 
time most indispensable,” because all such arrangements “have the 
effect of somewhat restraining trade and commerce, although to a very 
slight extent.”294 
The Court rejected the defendants’ fundamental challenge.295 While 
many beneficial agreements “restrain[ed] trade in some remote and 
indirect degree,” any assumption that the Act reached such restraints 
was “most violent.”296 The Court invoked Hopkins’s holding that the 
statute must have a “reasonable construction,” lest any agreements be 
said to have “indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate 
commerce, and possibly to restrain it.”297 Like Hopkins, the Court found 
this “reasonable construction” in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
holding that “the statute applies only to those contracts whose direct 
and immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce,” and not 
those affecting such commerce “indirectly or remotely.”298 The 
restraint actually before the Court did “directly affect[]” and “of course 
[was] intended to affect” interstate railroad rates by “destroying 
competition and by maintaining rates above what competition might 
produce.”299 Congress had authority to ban agreements producing 
such “rates and charges higher than they might otherwise be under the 
laws of competition.”300 
The Court reiterated these principles in Anderson v. United States,301 
another case involving bylaws of a livestock exchange.302 One bylaw 
prevented members from “recogniz[ing]” any trader not a member of 
                                               
 293. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
 294. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 566–67 (summarizing the defendants’ 
contentions). 
 295. Id. at 569. 
 296. Id. at 568. 
 297. Id. (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898)). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 569. 
 300. Id. at 571. Three Justices dissented without opinion, apparently reiterating 
their dissent in Trans-Missouri Freight, which did not question the direct/indirect 
distinction. Id. at 578 (stating that Justices Gray, Shiras, and White dissented); see 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 343 (1897) (White, J., 
dissenting, joined by Field, J., Shiras, J., and Gray, J.). 
 301. 171 U.S. 604 (1898). 
 302. Id. 
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the exchange.303 Another required all members of partnerships trading 
on the exchange to become members.304 The government contended 
that the bylaws excluded non-members from trading cattle transported 
across state lines, thus restraining interstate commerce.305 
Invoking Hopkins, the Court unanimously disagreed, again drawing 
an analogy between public and private restraints affecting interstate 
commerce.306 State legislation sometimes “affect[ed] foreign or interstate 
commerce without being intended to operate as commercial regulations.”307 
The “same is true,” the Court said, with “certain kinds of agreements entered 
into between persons engaged in the same business.”308 Agreements for the 
“bona fide purpose of properly and reasonably regulating the conduct of 
their business among themselves . . . . would be good,” even if they “indirectly 
and unintentionally[] affect[ed] interstate trade or commerce.”309 
Otherwise, the Court said, there would scarcely be any agreement that had 
“interstate or foreign commerce for its subject that may not remotely be said 
to, in some obscure way, affect that commerce and to be therefore void.”310 
The challenged agreements impacted interstate commerce only 
indirectly.311 The Association and restraints “ensure[d] a quick and 
certain market for the sale or purchase of the article dealt in” and 
“provide[d] a standard of business integrity among the members by 
adopting rules for just and fair dealing.”312 The agreements at issue in 
Anderson “differ[ed] radically” from agreements condemned under 
the Act,313 as the latter agreements “provided for fixing the prices of 
the articles dealt in.”314 The Anderson provisions “d[id] not meddle with 
prices,” and significant rivalry prevented competitive harm.315 While 
expulsions to enforce the Association’s rules excluded some rivals from 
                                               
 303. Id. at 611. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 612. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 616 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 473 (1888)). 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 617 (citing United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal & Coke Co., 46 F. 432 
(C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1891); United States v. Coal Dealers’ Ass’n of Cal., 85 F. 252 (C.C.N.D. 
Cal. 1898); and United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. (describing rivals of the Association as “mak[ing] a large competition 
wholly outside of the defendants”). 
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the market, there was no intent to affect interstate commerce “in the 
slightest degree,” and such expulsions affected interstate commerce 
“only most remotely and indirectly.”316 Invoking decisions sustaining 
state statutes against Commerce Clause challenges, the Court observed 
that the challenged agreement, like those statutes, placed no tax, 
condition, or license on “any instrument or subject of commerce.”317 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States318 was the decade’s last word on 
the subject, and the Court again drew upon its Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence when interpreting the Act.319 The government challenged 
a cartel of six pipe manufacturers located in four states.320 The 
defendants set prices above cost (including capital costs) and sold 
some output across state lines, while other sales were intrastate.321 The 
defendants claimed that the commerce power did not reach private 
restraints but merely empowered Congress to preempt state-imposed 
restraints of interstate commerce.322 They also claimed that banning 
such agreements would infringe liberty of contract and that reasonable 
prices did not directly restrain interstate commerce.323 
Invoking Gibbons (and E.C. Knight), the Court opined that the clause 
empowered Congress “to prescribe the rules by which [interstate 
commerce] shall be governed.”324 Conceding that concern over state-
imposed restraints motivated adoption of the clause, the Court echoed 
Anderson and Hopkins, analogizing private agreements to legislation 
and using “restrain” and “regulate” interchangeably.325 Some contracts could 
“in truth” have the same “effect” on interstate commerce as preempted state 
enactments, i.e., could “directly obstruct[] and thus regulate[]” interstate 
commerce.326 There was no reason that the commerce power would reach 
                                               
 316. Id. at 618. 
 317. Id. (citing Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102 (1876); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. 
S. 465, 473 (1888); and Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U.S. 590, 598 (1895)). 
 318. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 319. Id. at 227. 
 320. Id. at 212. 
 321. Id. at 213–25, 247–48. 
 322. Id. at 226–27. 
 323. Id. at 227–28. 
 324. Id. at 228, 241–42; see also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 
(1895); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). 
 325. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–30, 243–44. 
 326. Id. at 229–30 (“[P]rivate contracts may in truth be as far reaching in their effect 
upon interstate commerce as would the legislation of a single State of the same 
character.”); id. at 230 (“[A]nything which directly obstructs and thus regulates 
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only state enactments, while leaving private agreements that “directly 
and substantially, and not as a mere incident, regulate interstate 
commerce” to state authority.327 
The Court employed similar logic when rejecting defendants’ liberty 
of contract argument, holding there was no liberty to enter contracts 
that directly restrained and thus regulated interstate commerce.328 
Instead of delegating regulatory authority to private parties, the 
Constitution granted such power to Congress.329 Such agreements 
found no shelter in liberty of contract because “the direct results of 
such contracts might be the regulation of commerce among the States, 
possibly quite as effectually as if a State had passed a statute of like 
tenor as the contract.”330 
Once again, the Court drew upon its Commerce Clause jurisprudence to 
fix the boundaries between state and federal authority over private 
agreements. The Court equated private agreements that “restrained 
commerce among the states” with legislation that “directly” obstructed and 
thus “regulated” interstate commerce, therefore contravening Congress’s 
presumed intent to preempt such legislation. The Sherman Act thereby 
performed the same role vis-á-vis private restraints—banning those that 
“directly restrained and regulated” interstate commerce—as the Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its logic of quasi-statutory 
preemption performed with respect to state-imposed restraints.331 By the 
                                               
[interstate commerce], whether it is state legislation or private contracts . . . should be 
subject to the power of Congress . . . .”). 
 327. Id. at 229–30 (“If certain kinds of private contracts do directly . . . limit or 
restrain, and hence regulate interstate commerce, why should not the power of 
Congress reach those contracts just the same as if the legislation of some State had 
enacted the provisions contained in them?”). 
 328. Id. at 230 (stating that such “liberty of contract” would amount to freedom 
from regulation “of a subject which from its general and great importance has been 
granted to Congress as the proper representative of the nation at large”); see also Alan 
J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 60–65 (1999) 
(describing Addyston Pipe’s determination that the challenged restraint produced 
supracompetitive prices analogous to burdensome state enactments); William H. Page, 
Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antirust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1991) 
(asserting that both Joint Traffic and Addyston Pipe invoked “analog[ies] to 
governmental restrictions . . . to find the agreement[s] illegal”). 
 329. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 230. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See id. at 242 (holding that a contract “which directly operates . . . upon the 
sale, transportation and delivery of an article of interstate commerce, by preventing or 
restricting its sale, etc., thereby regulates interstate commerce to that extent and to the 
same extent trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates the 
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same logic, agreements that merely affected interstate commerce “indirectly” 
exceeded the scope of the Act.332 
The Court also offered a functional rationale for its definition of 
“restraint of . . . commerce among the several States” and for allocating 
authority over such agreements to Congress. Echoing the concerns 
about state legislation serving “local or partial interests” that animated 
its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court suggested that 
allocating authority over such agreements to states would produce sub-
optimal results, as states took different approaches to such agreements 
depending upon each state’s “particular interest.”333 Presumably such 
self-interest would manifest itself as lax regulation, perhaps even 
enforcement, of cartel agreements fixing prices for goods exported to 
other states. The result would be a regulatory policy that enriched a 
state’s own firms at the expense of out-of-state consumers, contradicting 
the anti-favoritism rationale of the Commerce Clause. 
The Court also observed that no state had attempted to regulate such 
agreements.334 This omission indicated that states (properly) believed 
congressional authority over such agreements was exclusive.335 Like 
rates for interstate transportation, where Congress had an “enlarged 
view of the interests of all the States,”336 the category of direct restraints 
of interstate commerce was inherently national, i.e., “a subject which 
from its general and great importance has been granted to Congress 
as the proper representative of the nation at large.”337 The Court’s 
invocation of these categories confirmed its belief that authority over 
                                               
statute”); id. at 226–27 (assuming “that the contract in question herein does directly and 
substantially operate as a restraint upon and as a regulation of interstate commerce,” 
thereby violating the Act). 
 332. Id. at 228–31 (asserting that the commerce power includes authority to 
prohibit “private contracts which directly and substantially, and not merely indirectly, 
remotely, incidentally and collaterally, regulate to a greater or less degree commerce 
among the States”). 
 333. See id. at 231; cf. supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text. 
 334. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 232. 
 335. Id. (“[I]t was [probably] supposed to be a subject over which state legislatures 
had no jurisdiction.”); Meese, supra note 247, at 2176–78 (explaining Addyston Pipe’s 
holding that Congress has exclusive authority over such agreements); see also Hadley 
Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242, 244 (8th Cir. 1906) (citing 
Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–33) (holding that states lacked authority over private 
agreements restraining interstate commerce). 
 336. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886). 
 337. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 230. The Court did not cite Wabash despite invocation 
of analogous reasoning. See id. 
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such restraints was mutually exclusive and that Congress lacked power 
over conduct impacting interstate commerce indirectly.338 
Having rejected defendants’ constitutional argument by assuming 
arguendo that the cartel “directly” restrained interstate commerce, the 
Court proceeded to examine whether the agreement produced such 
an effect.339 Consistent with Hopkins, Anderson, and Joint Traffic Ass’n, the 
Court focused on whether the restraints produced supracompetitive 
prices for interstate transactions.340 The Court rejected defendants’ 
claim that the cartel set reasonable prices, quoting verbatim three pages 
of findings that then-Circuit Judge William Howard Taft had assembled 
in his opinion for the Sixth Circuit.341 According to Judge Taft, 
defendants’ prices were unreasonable because they well-exceeded costs, 
including a reasonable return.342 Moreover, the agreements had the 
“immediate” effect of destroying competition so defendants could “obtain 
increased prices for themselves.”343 In sum, the agreement restrained 
commerce directly because it set supracompetitive prices for interstate 
transactions, imposing economic harm on out-of-state purchasers. 
This rationale also suggested limits on the reach of the Act—limits 
the Court also enforced. The Court reversed that portion of the Sixth 
Circuit’s order banning agreements between the defendants setting 
the price of intrastate transactions.344 The Court nowhere suggested 
that the Act would reach such restraints simply because they impacted 
interstate input purchases, for instance. Indeed, E.C. Knight, which the 
                                               
 338. But see supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing contrary position 
taken by some scholars and modern Court). 
 339. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 226–27 (characterizing defendants’ arguments as 
assuming that challenged agreements “directly and substantially operate as a restraint 
upon and as a regulation of interstate commerce”). 
 340. Id. at 240–41; cf. Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 617 (1898) (holding 
that challenged restraint did not directly affect interstate commerce where there was 
no evidence of price “meddl[ing]”); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 595–96 
(1898) (finding restraint indirect absent exorbitant charges); United States v. Joint 
Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569–70 (1898) (finding restraint “direct” because it produced 
supracompetitive prices). 
 341. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 235–38 (quoting United States v. Addyston Pipe 
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291–94 (6th Cir. 1898)). 
 342. Id. at 237–38 (quoting Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 291–94); id. at 238 (“[T]he 
combination . . . enhance[d] prices beyond a sum which was reasonable . . . .”). 
 343. Id. at 244. 
 344. Id. at 247 (“Although the jurisdiction of Congress over commerce among the 
States is full and complete, it is not questioned that it has none over that which is 
wholly within a State, and therefore none over combinations or agreements so far as 
they relate to a restraint of such trade or commerce.”). 
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Court reaffirmed, precluded such a result. After all, the defendants 
there bought inputs from outside Pennsylvania and resold most output 
in other states.345 But the Court held that a mere effect upon interstate 
commerce did not establish a “restraint” of such commerce.346 
In five unanimous or near-unanimous decisions in four years, the 
Court repeatedly analogized private agreements potentially governed 
by the Sherman Act to state enactments potentially preempted by the 
quasi-statutory regime implementing the implied will of Congress 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. This analogy naturally led the 
Court to read the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects 
from this regime into the Act. Just as Congress implicitly preempted 
state legislation that directly affected and thus regulated interstate 
commerce, so too did the Sherman Act interdict private restraints that 
produced such an effect. Conversely, the Act did not reach intrastate 
restraints affecting interstate commerce indirectly. This reading of the 
Act replicated that suggested by the prior construction canon.347 Taken 
together, the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the 
Sherman Act created a unified regime protecting free competition in 
interstate commerce from public and private threats. 
These decisions also articulated a consistent methodology for 
determining whether an impact on interstate commerce was “direct.” 
The Court repeatedly inquired whether the challenged agreements 
produced supracompetitive prices for interstate transactions or 
transportation and thus imposed economic harm upon out-of-state 
citizens.348 Application of this standard turned on facts regarding the 
challenged restraint, including the nature of the industry and defendants’ 
market position.349 Restraints that produced no such effects remained 
                                               
 345. See supra notes 259–63 and accompanying text. 
 346. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12, 15–16 (1895); see also Kidd 
v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 23 (1888) (holding that state police power regulations are 
constitutional so long as they do not directly affect interstate commerce). 
 347. See supra notes 215–23 and accompanying text (describing the prior 
construction canon and its application in specific cases). 
 348. See supra note 340 and accompanying text; see also Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 
58, at 446–49 (describing a similar “geographic market power test” for discerning 
whether the Act reaches local restraints). 
 349. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that then-contemporary 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence required a fact-intensive analysis of the challenged 
state legislation). 
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within the exclusive authority of individual states.350 Just as Standard Oil 
had drawn on various sources to determine the content of the Rule of 
Reason, so too did the Court draw upon Commerce Clause principles 
to define the term “direct.”351 
Such repeated holdings deserved respect as a matter of stare 
decisis—respect that Mandeville Island Farms did not accord them. 
These holdings also constitute an important indication of the original 
meaning of the statute. Together with the prior construction and 
avoidance canons, these contemporaneous constructions rebut the 
claim that Congress attempted to exercise concurrent power to ban 
agreements that produced only indirect impacts on interstate commerce. 
Instead, Congress apparently treated authority over trade restraints as 
mutually exclusive, using the direct/indirect standard to define the 
boundary between state and federal authority. Moreover, a restraint 
was only “direct” if it produced interstate competitive harm. 
B.   Did Congress Mean the Act to Expand in Response to Novel Commerce 
Clause Standards? 
The modern Court has not acknowledged the Commerce Clause 
origins of the term “restraint of . . . commerce among the several States” 
and thus has not grappled with Congress’s apparent invocation of pre-
1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence to define the reach of the Act. 
Proponents of the “substantial effects” test may nonetheless emphasize 
that Congress’s choice of the constitutional phrase “restraint of . . . 
commerce among the several States” strengthens the claim that Congress 
meant to exercise the full extent of its commerce power when addressing 
harmful agreements. Even if the 1890 Congress did not intend to displace 
then-current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, proponents might argue, 
it is still entirely proper to read Wickard’s substantial effects test into 
the Act, thereby effectuating Congress’s desire to exercise its entire 
commerce power over trade restraints. As explained earlier, the 
Supreme Court has invoked this reasoning.352 
                                               
 350. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, 
at 408 (“[A]ccording to competitive federalism, trade restraints that do not plausibly 
increase prices to consumers outside the home state should lie beyond federal reach.”). 
 351. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911); see also supra 
note 128 and accompanying text (describing how Standard Oil drew upon various 
sources to determine content of the Rule of Reason). 
 352. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. One scholar asserts that 
“Congress has never volunteered that the [commerce] power should be viewed more 
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Few would deny that the practical reach of the Act properly expands 
(or contracts) if changed circumstances result in revised application of 
an unchanged direct/indirect standard.353 However, the substantial 
effects test is an entirely new standard unknown to the enacting 
Congress, a standard that reflects different normative choices about 
the proper allocation of authority between states and the national 
government. Did the 1890 Congress wish to exercise the maximum 
extent of its commerce power under whatever standard the Supreme 
Court might later adopt? The text of the Sherman Act neither alludes 
to such an intention nor precludes this approach. Moreover, the 
empirical record does not compel the conclusion that Congress would 
reflexively exercise whatever authority the Court might subsequently 
provide. After all, the 1890 Congress and its predecessors rarely 
exercised the commerce power, even over subjects with respect to 
which Congress’s authority was unquestioned.354 
Even modern Congresses sometimes decline to exercise the full 
extent of the commerce power. For instance, Congress certainly 
possesses authority to preempt state corporate law governing enterprises 
operating in interstate commerce and require all such firms to 
incorporate under a federal statute.355 However, Congress has declined 
to nationalize corporate law, leaving individual states—particularly 
Delaware—to generate rules structuring the internal governance of the 
nation’s largest commercial enterprises.356 Moreover, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act357 required many employers to 
provide employees health insurance but exempted all firms with fewer 
                                               
narrowly [than the maximum] or the Act read more narrowly than its potential.” See 
Gavil, supra note 122, at 695. As shown herein, this statement does not survive scrutiny. 
   353. See infra notes 407–17 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s 
subsequent revision of E.C. Knight’s application of the direct/indirect standard).  
 354. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (“During this period 
there was perhaps little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce 
power . . . .”). 
 355. See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) 
(describing proposals to subject corporations operating in interstate commerce to 
national corporation law). 
 356. Id. at 25 (describing congressional consideration of proposals in the 1970s to 
nationalize corporate law). 
 357. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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than fifty full-time employees.358 However, Congress plainly has the 
authority to require smaller firms to carry such insurance.359 
Antitrust itself provides three instances in which Congress has 
declined to exercise the full extent of the commerce power as defined 
by the Supreme Court. In 1944, the Court ruled that insurance 
constitutes “commerce” within the meaning of the Commerce Clause 
and the Sherman Act, applying the Act to an interstate insurance 
cartel.360 Congress responded with the McCarran-Ferguson Act,361 
exempting the “business of insurance” from federal antitrust law, with 
some exceptions.362 The exemption still survives, despite bipartisan 
opposition from antitrust agencies and scholars.363 Moreover, when 
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act364 in 1936, it declined to 
exercise its entire commerce power, banning only offending conduct 
occurring “in” interstate commerce and not intrastate conduct that 
“directly affects” such commerce.365 Finally, Congress also declined to 
exercise its full commerce power when it re-enacted section 7 of the 
Clayton Act,366 the federal anti-merger statute, in 1950.367 This statute 
applies only to mergers between firms “engaged in commerce,” and 
                                               
 358. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018). 
 359. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154–57 (1971) (holding that the 
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate local extortion); Daniel v. Paul, 395 
U.S. 298, 305 (1969) (finding that the commerce power reached a snack bar selling 
“four food items,” including hamburgers and soft drinks, because some ingredients in 
three items originated in other states); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296, 304 
(1964) (determining that the Commerce Clause authorized a ban on discrimination 
by restaurant with thirty-six employees because firm’s local supplier purchased out-of-
state meat). 
 360. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553, 562 (1944). 
 361. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2018). 
 362. Id. § 1011; see Susan Beth Farmer, Competition and Regulation in the Insurance 
Sector: Reassessing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 89 OR. L. REV. 915, 936 (2011) (describing 
origins and operation of the Act). 
 363. See Alan J. Meese, Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and 
a New Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 255, 264–65 (2013) (describing 
enforcement agency opposition); id. at 330–32 (advocating exemption’s repeal). 
 364. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018). 
 365. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 193–95 (1974) (concluding 
that the Robinson-Patman Act only reaches conduct “in” interstate commerce and not 
intrastate conduct “affecting” such commerce); Local 167, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 291 U.S. 293, 297 (1934) (applying the Sherman Act to intrastate 
conduct that “directly . . . restrain[ed]” interstate movement of poultry). 
 366. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018). 
 367. See id. 
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not to those between firms subject to the commerce power because they 
“affect” interstate commerce.368 
The prospect of post-Wickard expansion of the Sherman Act also 
raised novel questions beyond contemplation of the 1890 Congress. 
For instance, the Court coupled expansion of the commerce power 
with a relaxation of the pre-Wickard assumption that authority over 
most commercial activity was mutually exclusive, with the result that 
states and the national government now possess concurrent authority 
over most trade restraints.369 Expansion of the Act thus required the 
Court to determine whether the statute preempted state antitrust 
regulation that purported to ban practices deemed reasonable under 
federal standards.370 This expansion and recognition of concurrent 
authority also facilitated application of the Act to various state-
approved restraints, thereby requiring the Court to decide whether 
and how federal courts would supervise local regulation under the 
aegis of the Sherman Act.371 Finally, decisions such as Wickard 
expanded the commerce power along two dimensions: the substantial 
effects test and the aggregation test, creating the prospect of analogous 
expansions of the Act.372 
Any decision to adjust the scope of the Act in light of the expanded 
reach of the commerce power would require—and did require—
judicial resolution of these and other issues, with no guidance from the 
statutory text or any other source of statutory meaning. The result was 
judicial policymaking unmoored to any intelligible legal standard. For 
instance, while the Court embraced Wickard’s substantial effects test 
under the Sherman Act, it has simultaneously declined to employ the 
aggregation test.373 Moreover, while the Court held that the Act usually 
                                               
 368. Id.; see United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975) 
(“[T]he phrase ‘engaged in commerce’ as used in § 7 of the Clayton Act means 
engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, and was not intended to reach all 
corporations engaged in activities subject to the federal commerce power.”); id. at 
279–80 (explaining that Congress reenacted this statute in 1950 knowing it did not 
reach activities “affecting commerce”). 
 369. See infra notes 398–401 and accompanying text. 
 370. See infra note 400 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra Section II.A (describing both aspects of Wickard). 
 373. Instead, the Court has examined whether the restraint itself produces the 
requisite effect on interstate commerce. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 
Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (invoking Wickard only for substantial effects test); Hosp. 
Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976) (invoking Mandeville Island 
Farms only for substantial effects test); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967) (per 
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does not preempt state antitrust regulation of private restraints, it 
simultaneously held that the Act preempts some (but not all) restraints 
authorized by states themselves.374 In each case, the Court has engaged 
in judicial lawmaking, announcing rules to govern questions that 
Congress did not anticipate or address in 1890. It is by no means 
certain that the 1890 Congress would have delegated legislative 
authority over such questions to unelected judges, even assuming such 
a capacious delegation was constitutional.375 
In short, it is conceivable that Congress meant the Sherman Act to 
incorporate any commerce power standard the Supreme Court might 
subsequently announce, including a standard unknown in 1890. 
However, it seems at least equally possible that Congress would have 
declined to delegate such authority to future Courts. One thing is certain: 
the statute contains no affirmative indication regarding Congress’s view 
of the question. 
Fortunately, there is a canon of construction well-suited for resolving 
this ambiguity—namely, the federal-state balance canon.376 The Court 
first employed this canon during the 1940s to temper vast expansions 
of the commerce power in various contexts, including the Federal 
Trade Commission Act377 and even the Sherman Act.378 The canon 
                                               
curiam) (same); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 n.12 
(1974) (distinguishing case-by-case Sherman Act inquiry from instances where 
“Congress itself has defined the specific persons and activities that affect commerce”). 
 374. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101–02 (1989) (holding that the 
Sherman Act generally does not preempt more intrusive state antitrust remedies for 
conduct condemned by state and federal law). Compare FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 
621, 634, 638 (1992) (invalidating state-authorized price fixing because state did not 
adequately supervise private actors that state law authorized to determine prices), with 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–52 (1943) (holding that the Sherman Act did not 
invalidate state-imposed limit on raisin output). 
 375. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406–09 (1928) 
(invalidating delegation of authority to the executive branch because Congress did not 
articulate an “intelligible principle” governing that delegation). 
 376. See Barrett, supra note 208, at 123–24 (describing different canons of statutory 
interpretation and noting that some, including federalism canons, serve “constitutional 
values”). 
   377. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018). 
 378. See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 450 (1953); Apex 
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940) (declining to apply the Sherman Act 
to a union conspiracy that closed a factory shipping goods in interstate commerce 
because maintaining “a proper distribution between state and national governments 
of police authority and of remedies for private and public . . . wrongs is of far-reaching 
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requires courts to avoid reading federal statutes to invade “domain[s] 
traditionally left to the States,” unless the statute clearly requires such 
a significant expansion of federal power.379 
Despite referencing the balance of authority between sovereigns, this 
canon only applies when ascertaining the reach of statutes regulating 
private parties, independent of any question of preemption.380 The 
Court has invoked this canon in cases involving the regulation of 
firearms,381 possession of gambling devices,382 arson of a dwelling,383 
local unfair competition,384 and violent strikes shuttering factories 
producing goods for interstate sale.385 In each case, the Court refused to 
apply a federal statute to private conduct traditionally subject only to 
state regulation, even though the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents 
empowered Congress to regulate such activity.386 Describing operation 
of this canon in the context of commercial regulation, Justice Frankfurter 
explained that expansive application of federal statutes in novel 
circumstances would be “retrospective” and “properly deserve[] the 
stigma of judicial legislation.”387 
                                               
importance [and] [a]n intention to disturb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to 
Congress”). 
 379. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971) (“[U]nless Congress conveys its 
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state 
balance.”); see also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (quoting Bass, 404 
U.S. at 350) (same); Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. at 450 (“[W]e must assume that the 
implications and limitations of our federal system constitute a major premise of all 
congressional legislation, though not repeatedly recited therein.”); FTC v. Bunte 
Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941) (declining to treat local commercial practices as “in 
commerce” because “[a]n inroad upon local conditions and local standards of such 
far-reaching import . . . ought to await a clearer mandate from Congress”); Apex 
Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 513. 
 380. Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1947) (articulating 
canon against preemption over subjects traditionally subject to state regulation). 
 381. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 344–45, 349. 
 382. See Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. at 449–51. 
 383. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 852, 858. 
 384. See Bunte Bros, 312 U.S. at 351–52; Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 540 
(contending that federal courts must read federal statutes in light of the nation’s dual 
system of government). 
 385. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940). 
 386. See, e.g., Jones, 529 U.S. at 858–59 (declining to apply statute to arson of dwelling 
consuming out-of-state natural gas because doing so would alter federal-state balance 
and “arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime”). 
 387. See Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 540 (“[W]hen the Federal Government takes 
over such local radiations in the vast network of our national economic enterprise and 
thereby radically readjusts the balance of state and national authority, [Congress is] 
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Development of this canon paralleled development of a related 
canon, namely, the presumption against preemption of state law.388 
Both canons buttress states’ regulatory prerogatives over conduct the 
primary effects of which occur within states’ borders, thereby preserving 
regulatory diversity in a federal system.389 States may exercise these 
prerogatives in various ways. They may ban such conduct (imposing 
the same, more lenient, or harsher penalties as provided by federal 
law), allow such conduct, or even encourage it.390 
Intrastate restraints that impact interstate commerce indirectly are 
certainly a “domain traditionally left to the States.”391 As explained 
earlier, states have been regulating intrastate restraints, including 
those producing substantial fortuitous effects on interstate commerce, 
since before 1890, employing corporate, antitrust, and contract law.392 
The Supreme Court bolstered such regulation by repeatedly declining, 
over five decades, to apply the Sherman Act to such conduct, granting 
states exclusive authority.393 States exercised such authority with gusto, 
bringing numerous cases under their own antitrust laws.394 States also 
declined to ban certain intrastate restraints that would have violated the 
Sherman Act if deemed restraints of interstate commerce.395 The Supreme 
                                               
reasonably explicit and do[es] not entrust its attainment to that retrospective expansion 
of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.”). 
 388. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 234–37 (1947); Ernest A. Young, 
Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, 
NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 264–66 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) 
(explaining how Rice presumption protects traditional state prerogatives). 
 389. Cf. Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1681, 1707–08 (2008) (explaining how presumption against preemption reflects 
the Constitution’s background assumption that state law governs most disputes). 
 390. Cf. Jones, 529 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that congressional 
imposition of prison sentence more than triple that of analogous state law illustrated 
how federal legislation “may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State”); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating 
that states “perform[ing] their role[s] as laboratories for experimentation” reveals 
“the theory and utility of our federalism”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 n.15 
(1971) (observing that some states allowed firearm possession); New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 391. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 339. 
 392. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
 393. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 394. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text (discussing state antitrust 
enforcement in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
 395. For example, during the 1930s, several states adopted “fair trade” laws 
exempting minimum resale price maintenance from their own antitrust laws whenever 
the manufacturer’s products faced significant inter-brand competition. See Dr. Miles 
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Court and other courts repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to 
regulation of local restraints that also incidentally impacted interstate 
commerce, further legitimizing such regulation.396 Indeed, in 1989, the 
Court recognized the “long history of state common-law and statutory 
remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices” and concluded 
that state antitrust law is “an area traditionally regulated by the States.”397 
By abruptly expanding the Act to reach intrastate restraints with 
fortuitous effects on interstate commerce, the Court significantly 
altered the allocation of regulatory responsibility between states and 
the nation, granting the latter authority over restraints producing only 
intrastate harm. To be sure, the Court simultaneously jettisoned 
precedents holding that jurisdiction over commercial activity was 
                                               
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 373, 400 (1911) (condemning 
interstate resale price maintenance under section 1 of the Act); Ewald T. Grether, 
Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. 
REV. 640, 640 & n.2 (1936) (reporting that, as of 1935, California and nine other states, 
representing forty percent of the nation’s population, had adopted such legislation). 
Congress, of course, empowered states to adopt “fair trade” legislation with respect to 
minimum resale price maintenance governing interstate sales between 1937 and 1975, 
thereby exempting such agreements from the Sherman Act. See Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 904–05 (2007) (recounting this 
history). Some states also recognized a reasonable price defense to horizontal price 
fixing, a defense not available under the Sherman Act. See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 
U.S. 445, 453 (1927) (invalidating Colorado statute recognizing such a defense as 
unduly vague). 
 396. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 420–22 (1910) 
(rejecting equal protection challenge to state antitrust statute); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. 
v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 108–09, 111 (1909) (rejecting due process challenge to state 
antitrust law); Nat’l Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 127–33 (1905) (rejecting 
due process and equal protection challenge to state antitrust statute); Smiley v. Kansas, 
196 U.S. 447, 454–55, 457 (1905) (rejecting due process challenge to state antitrust 
statute); Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 65 So. 468, 470–71 (Miss. 
1914) (condemning local price discrimination under state antitrust law even though 
product was manufactured out-of-state); Commonwealth v. Strauss, 78 N.E. 136, 136, 
138–39 (Mass. 1906) (invalidating local tying agreement under state antitrust law even 
though tied product was manufactured out-of-state); id. at 139 (“This statute does not 
attempt directly to regulate interstate commerce . . . . Indirectly it affects it . . . where 
contracts are made for the sale and transportation of property in another state to a 
purchaser in this state.”); see also In re Op. of the Justices, 99 N.E. 294, 294 (Mass. 1912) 
(explaining that proposed Massachusetts antitrust statute reached only intrastate 
restraints and thus did not purport to regulate interstate commerce despite indirect 
impact on such commerce). 
 397. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989). 
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mutually exclusive.398 Thus, states remained free to regulate agreements 
now subject to the Sherman Act.399 However, as noted earlier, state 
regulation could only replicate or exceed the scope of regulation 
imposed via the Sherman Act, which now provided a regulatory floor.400 
The result was a (much) smaller sphere of exclusive state authority and 
less regulatory diversity.401 
This major shift occurred without any amendment of the Sherman 
Act and no other “clear expression” of congressional purpose.402 Thus, 
in the words of Justice Frankfurter, the shift “radically readjust[ed] the 
balance of state and national authority” and constituted “retrospective 
expansion of meaning” and “judicial legislation.”403 Indeed, Mandeville 
Island Farms, the origin of the shift, did not mention the federal-state 
                                               
 398. See Meese, supra note 247, at 2185–86 (explaining how the post-New Deal Court 
validated overlapping state and federal authority over trade restraints). 
 399. Id. at 2164–66; Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the 
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 536–39 (1997) (explaining how the post-
New Deal Court altered Commerce Clause jurisprudence to avoid invalidating state 
laws directly burdening interstate commerce); see also ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100–
01 (rejecting claim that Sherman Act preempted state antitrust statute permitting 
indirect purchasers to recover treble damages despite the fact that such recovery is not 
available under the Sherman Act); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 130–
34 (1978) (rejecting Commerce Clause and Sherman Act challenges to state ban on 
procompetitive vertical integration and price discrimination). 
 400. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. For instance, state fair trade laws 
that purported to exempt most local minimum resale price maintenance from state 
regulation became irrelevant because the Sherman Act now reached nearly all such 
agreements. While Congress empowered states to exempt such agreements from the 
Act in 1937, Congress repealed this authorization in 1975, subjecting minimum resale 
price maintenance to a uniform national ban, until 2007, when the Court declared 
such agreements subject to fact-intensive rule of reason scrutiny. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 
885–87, 904–05 (overruling Dr. Miles and holding that courts should evaluate 
minimum resale price maintenance under a fact-intensive rule of reason analysis). 
 401. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (identifying various state 
enforcement regimes prior to the Court’s expansion of the scope of the Sherman Act); 
cf. Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 451–59 (describing benefits of competitive 
federalism in production of antitrust doctrine). 
 402. See infra Part VI and accompanying text (finding no indication in legislative 
history that Congress meant to alter the balance between state and federal authority 
over trade restraints); cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (articulating 
the requirement that Congress clearly express its purpose to “significantly change[] 
the federal-state balance”). 
 403. Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 540. 
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balance canon, which the Court had applied twice earlier in the same 
decade in antitrust cases.404 
C.   Do Changed Economic Circumstances Justify the Substantial Effects Test? 
Resolution of the first two arguments for adopting the substantial 
effects test paves the way for evaluation of the third: namely, that the 
test is a faithful translation of the underlying principle governing the 
scope of the Act. Any effort to translate a legal text in light of changed 
circumstances must begin by identifying the principle animating the 
relevant text and reflecting the lawgiver’s normative choices. Unfortunately, 
no proponent of the substantial effects test has identified the underlying 
principle that, when properly translated, mandates adoption of this test. 
Thus, scholars evaluating the changed circumstances argument must 
attempt to identify such a principle. As explained, the best evidence of 
statutory meaning establishes that by adopting the term “in restraint 
of . . . commerce among the several States,” Congress invoked a term 
of art referring to state statutes that “regulate interstate commerce . . . 
in a constitutional sense.”405 Thus, Congress meant to reach those 
private agreements that imposed a similar effect on interstate commerce 
and injured consumers in more than one state, because states would 
likely exercise any regulatory authority over such contracts in a self-
interested or “partial” manner that favored their own citizens over 
others.406 
Like its progenitor in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the 
Sherman Act’s direct/indirect standard was fact-intensive and flexible, 
allowing for evolving applications—translations—in light of exogenous 
changes in context.407 This flexibility allowed the Court to adjust the 
reach of the Act to effectuate Congress’s apparent intent to exercise 
exclusive authority over intrastate agreements that produced interstate 
harm and thus would otherwise be subject to suboptimal rules 
generated by states with distorted incentives. 
                                               
 404. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 350, 355 (1941) (limiting the reach of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 494–95, 
500–01 (1940) (limiting the scope of the Sherman Act). 
 405. See supra notes 238–44 and accompanying and immediately following text 
(canvassing nineteenth century case law equating “restraint” with “regulation” prior to 
passage of the Sherman Act). 
 406. See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
 407. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 195, at 58–59 (explaining how application of a standard 
can vary with changing facts). 
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The modification of E.C. Knight exemplifies such a translation of an 
unchanged principle in light of new information. Mandeville Island 
Farms and Wickard characterized the decision as mechanically holding 
that the Act could never reach a merger between manufacturers.408 
Subsequently, in Standard Oil, the Court condemned a scheme 
including numerous mergers to monopolize the national refined oil 
market.409 The Court rejected the defendants’ contention that E.C. 
Knight sheltered these mergers from Sherman Act condemnation, 
finding that the challenged scheme not only restrained trade, but also 
directly affected interstate commerce.410 Moreover, as previously 
described, the Court would repeatedly opine that an intrastate 
agreement affected interstate commerce “directly” and thus fell within 
the Sherman Act if the parties intended to restrain interstate 
commerce.411 Plaintiffs could prove intent expressly or courts could 
infer it from surrounding circumstances, particularly market structure, 
the economic position of the parties to the agreement, and the 
location of the restraint’s victims.412 
The Court never identified what circumstances justified post-E.C. 
Knight applications of the Act to intrastate restraints such as mergers 
between manufacturers. However, it is not difficult to imagine an 
explanation. Recall that, in Addyston Pipe, the Court had articulated 
how states lacked appropriate incentives to regulate cartels that 
exercised market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers.413 
The Court rejected the view of some that supracompetitive pricing was 
impossible absent predatory tactics or state-created entry barriers.414 If 
                                               
 408. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 409. 221 U.S. 1, 73–77 (1911). 
 410. Id. at 68–69 (recounting the contention that E.C. Knight precluded application 
of the Act to defendants’ conduct). 
 411. See supra notes 37–46 and accompanying text (summarizing this case law). 
 412. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United States v. 
Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 542–43 (1913) (finding that intrastate restraint cornering New 
York cotton exchange raised inference that defendants intended to directly restrain 
interstate commerce). 
 413. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231 (1899) 
(explaining that states would adopt self-interested policies toward direct restraints of 
interstate commerce). 
 414. See generally Meese, supra note 328, at 30–33 (describing views of then-Judge 
Peckham and Thomas Cooley during the 1880s that private restraints could not 
maintain supracompetitive prices absent predatory tactics and/or state-created entry 
barriers). Peckham later authored Addyston Pipe, which included a finding that a 
private cartel produced prices above the competitive level. See id. at 67 (“The facts in 
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a private agreement between six firms could produce such interstate 
harm, it would seem to follow that a merger to monopoly over a 
product sold in interstate commerce could cause the same impact. Just 
as states possessed suboptimal incentives vis-á-vis the regulation of 
private restraints of interstate commerce itself, so too did they possess 
suboptimal incentives with respect to intrastate restraints, including 
mergers, that directly burdened interstate commerce by raising 
interstate prices.415 Indeed, New Jersey had acted on such incentives in 
the late nineteenth century, adjusting its corporate law to facilitate 
mergers—including those in E.C. Knight and Standard Oil—that injured 
out-of-state consumers by creating market power over interstate 
markets.416 Presumably, the Standard Oil Court was aware of these 
developments as well as pre-1910 reform efforts by soon-to-be 
Governor Woodrow Wilson and others.417 Expansion of the Sherman 
Act to reach such restraints, perhaps contrary to the subjective 
expectations of the 1890 Congress, was a faithful implementation of 
the unchanged principle that animated and determined the scope of 
the statute and resulting division of authority between states and the 
national government. 
The validity of one translation does not suggest that all proposed 
translations are legitimate, however. No Supreme Court justice or other 
proponent of the “substantial effects” test has identified any changed 
circumstances suggesting that all or most agreements that induce 
substantial impacts on interstate commerce result in interstate harm 
or that states otherwise lack proper incentives to regulate such 
agreements. To be sure, the nation’s economy is more integrated than 
in 1890, commerce takes many different forms, and economic activity 
                                               
Addyston Pipe [showed] . . . that purely private cartels could drive prices above the 
competitive level without state assistance or private restraints on the behavior of third 
parties . . . . Peckham could no longer cling to the result he had advocated so forcefully 
[in the 1880s].”). 
 415. Cf. Patten, 226 U.S. at 541–44 (finding that Act reached intrastate conspiracy 
to corner cotton sales on New York Exchange given likely impact upon price of cotton 
traded in interstate commerce). 
 416. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875–1929, 49 J. 
ECON. HIST. 677, 678–79, 681 (1989) (describing New Jersey’s success in the late 
nineteenth century at attracting incorporations by empowering such firms to merge 
with rivals with impunity); Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 84–86 (documenting how 
developments in New Jersey corporate law undermined states’ ability to protect their 
citizens from mergers creating market power). 
 417. See Grandy, supra note 416, at 687–89 (describing contemporary recognition 
that New Jersey had created a “legal externality” and resulting reform efforts). 
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often takes place in larger enterprises.418 Thus, some restraints that 
produced no impact on interstate commerce in 1890 may now do so.419 
Still, a mere effect on such commerce does not constitute interstate 
harm and thereby justify federal intervention under the anti-favoritism 
principle that apparently animated the meaning of “restraint of . . . 
commerce among the several States.” The Court that articulated pre-
1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence and presumably the Congress 
that enacted the Sherman Act were well aware that local activity could 
impact interstate commerce. Indeed, the whole point of the Commerce 
Clause was to empower Congress to prevent states from thwarting 
economic integration by enacting self-interested legislation—including 
regulation of local subjects—that burdened interstate commerce.420 
The nineteenth century Court employed the direct/indirect standard 
as applied to state regulation of intrastate activity to distinguish effects 
that gave rise to the possibility of self-interested legislation from those 
that did not.421 
The Court applied the same direct/indirect standard under the 
Sherman Act for five decades to distinguish restraints that produced 
interstate harm from those that merely produced interstate effects. 
Proof that a greater proportion of trade restraints now impacts 
interstate commerce likely means there will be more occasions to apply 
the direct/indirect standard. Moreover, such applications may identify 
more restraints producing direct impacts than during the pre-Wickard 
era. Neither result, however, suggests that the direct/indirect standard 
and the anti-favoritism principle it implements are somehow 
inadequate. There is simply no indication that the substantial effects test 
is a superior method of identifying restraints that states are unwilling or 
unable to regulate in an optimal manner. Instead of applying the 
original principle in light of new facts, then, the substantial effects test 
apparently engrafts an entirely new principle onto the Sherman Act 
and imputes to Congress the endorsement of a standard that body 
never heard of, let alone embraced. 
                                               
 418. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1991) (“[A]s the 
dimensions and complexity of our economy have grown, the federal power over 
commerce, and the concomitant coverage of the Sherman Act, have experienced 
similar expansion.”); supra note 118 (collecting additional cases). 
 419. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (“As interstate 
commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come 
to have effects on the national economy . . . .”). 
 420. See supra Section II.A. 
 421. See supra Part I. 
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VI.    THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Application of conventional tools of statutory construction establishes 
that the Sherman Act reaches only those intrastate restraints that 
“directly” affect interstate commerce by producing harm exceeding the 
boundaries of a single state. The Supreme Court has looked beyond 
such conventional sources of meaning, however, invoking the Act’s 
legislative history to support the modern approach.422 Indeed, the 
Court’s most recent pronouncement on the scope of the Act vis-á-vis 
local restraints summarized the Act’s legislative history as follows: “The 
floor debates on the Sherman Act reveal, in Senator Sherman’s words, 
an intent to ‘g[o] as far as the Constitution permits Congress to go.’”423 
In support of this assertion, the Court cited United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass’n,424 which had similarly claimed that “all the 
acceptable evidence” established that “Congress wanted to go to the 
utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and 
monopoly agreements.”425 South-Eastern Underwriters had also concluded 
that there is “not one piece of reliable evidence that the Congress of 
1890 intended to freeze the proscription of the Sherman Act within 
the mold of then current judicial decisions defining the commerce 
power.”426 This later statement and others rebuked the claim that the 
Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence established limits 
on the reach of the Act.427 South-Eastern Underwriters had invoked three 
                                               
 422. See, e.g., United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 555–60, 558 n.46 
(1944) (reviewing legislative reports and recounting statements by congressional 
sponsors of the Sherman Act). 
 423. See Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 328, n.7 (quoting 20 CONG. REC. 1167 (1899)); 
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (quoting Apex 
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940)) (“Congress, in passing the Sherman 
Act, left no area of its constitutional power unoccupied; it ‘exercised all the power it 
possessed.’”); Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 493 n.15 (reaching same conclusion after review 
of legislative history); see also Gavil, supra note 159, at 692–93 (contending that 
Congress intended the Act to expand along with the commerce power); id. at 683–95 
(reviewing legislative history, including statements by Senator Sherman, and 
concluding that the Senate did not embrace the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence); id. at 690 n.149. 
 424. 332 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 425. Id. at 557–58. 
 426. Id. at 557. 
 427. Id. at 556–57 (“[W]e fail to find in the legislative history of the Act an 
expression of a clear and unequivocal desire of Congress to legislate only within that 
area previously declared by this Court to be within the federal power.”). 
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snippets of legislative history to buttress these claims, each a quotation 
from a different participant in congressional floor debates: 
(1)    “The bill has been very ingeniously and properly drawn to cover 
every case which comes within what is called the commercial power of 
Congress.”428 
(2)    “I do not wish to single out any particular trust or combination. It 
is not a particular trust, but the system I aim at.”429 
(3)    “The provisions of this trust bill are just as broad, sweeping, and 
explicit as the English language can make them to express the power of 
Congress over this subject under the Constitution of the United States.”430 
Proponents of the substantial effects test would presumably contend 
that such history provides the sort of “clear statement” of Congress’s 
desire to upset the traditional federal-state balance, for instance. The 
current Supreme Court is less receptive to legislative history than it was 
during the 1940s and 1950s, however, and may be reluctant to rely 
upon such history to override the apparent meaning of the statute.431 
As it turns out, there is no such conflict for the Court to resolve. Instead 
of supporting the “substantial effects” test, the legislative history appears 
to bolster the conclusions reached in Section V.A above, namely, that 
Congress likely embraced the Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence 
and mutual exclusivity of state and federal authority over trade 
restraints. Moreover, there appears to be no evidence that Congress 
meant the scope of the Act to expand if the Court rejected its pre-1890 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in favor of novel standards governing 
the reach of the Commerce Clause. 
A.   The Senate 
While often described as a codification of the common law, the 
Sherman Act had its genesis in a controversy about tariff policy. President 
Cleveland’s 1887 Annual Message called for substantial tariff reduction.432 
He claimed that tariffs often facilitated domestic cartels’ “regulation of 
the supply and price of commodities made and sold by members of the 
combination.”433 
                                               
 428. Id. at 588 n.46 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890) (statement of Sen. George)). 
 429. Id. (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)). 
 430. Id. (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 6314 (1890) (statement of Rep. Stewart)). 
 431. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304 
(2006) (rejecting contention that legislative history overrode meaning of statute 
determined by conventional textual methods). 
 432. See President Grover Cleveland, State of the Union Address (Dec. 6, 1887). 
 433. Id. 
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Like many Republicans, Senator Sherman434 supported robust 
protective tariffs.435 Nonetheless, he expressed support for reducing tariffs 
on goods with respect to which domestic “combinations [would] prevent 
a reduction of price by fair competition.”436 Six months later, Sherman 
introduced a resolution directing the Senate Finance Committee to 
investigate measures for controlling contracts, trusts, or other 
arrangements that tended to “prevent free and full competition” or 
“tend[ed] to foster monopoly or to artificially advance the cost to the 
consumer of necessary articles of human life.”437 
Five weeks later, Sherman introduced legislation to advance these 
objectives. The bill purported to regulate agreements impacting 
production and articles of “domestic growth.”438 The Committee soon 
reported a significantly-altered bill on September 11, 1888.439 Apparently 
for constitutional reasons, the bill struck unqualified references to 
“production” and “articles of domestic growth.”440 Like the original bill, 
this version bore little resemblance to what would become the Sherman 
Act. The new version tethered the bill’s coverage to markets involving 
foreign or interstate commerce, banning concerted action that limited 
free competition in: 
(1)  “importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into 
the United States”; 
(2)   “production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth 
or production, or domestic raw material that competes with any similar 
article [subject to an American tariff]”; 
(3)   “production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth 
or production, or domestic raw material . . . which shall be transported 
from one State or Territory to another.”441 
                                               
  434. This Article refers to members of the 1890 Congress using their title in the first 
instance and omits titles in most subsequent references for brevity. 
 435. See 19 CONG. REC. 187 (1888) (expressing support for reasonable tariffs in a 
reply to President Cleveland’s address). 
 436. Id. at 190; see HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION 
OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 167 (1954) (noting that Senator Sherman generally 
supported tariffs unless such exactions fostered combinations or monopolies). 
 437. See 19 CONG. REC. 6041 (1888). 
 438. See S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888) (as introduced Aug. 14, 1888). 
 439. See S. 3445 (as amended Sept. 11, 1888); THORELLI, supra note 436, at 170 
(discussing introduction of revised S. 3445). 
 440. THORELLI, supra note 436, at 170 (suggesting that September 11 version of S. 
3445 eliminated certain “obvious [constitutional] defects” of the initial bill). 
 441. S. 3445 (as amended Sept. 11, 1888). 
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By including “articles” competing with those subject to tariffs, the new 
language fulfilled Sherman’s desire to prevent tariffs from encouraging 
anticompetitive combinations.442 The bill expired without further action.443 
Sherman reintroduced the bill in the 51st Congress on December 4, 
1889, and the Senate referred the bill to the Finance Committee.444 
The Senate took up the bill on January 14, 1890.445 The Senate then 
began debate on the bill, now denominated S. 1, which replicated the 
September 11, 1888 version verbatim.446 Several Senators raised 
constitutional objections to Sherman’s measure. 
Most importantly, Senator James George, former Chief Justice of 
Mississippi and a member of the Judiciary Committee, argued that 
various applications of the bill exceeded Congress’s authority.447 The 
Supreme Court has quoted George in support of its broad characterization 
of the Act and contention that the scope of the Act expands whenever the 
Court expands the scope of the commerce power.448 A review of George’s 
speech and his colleagues’ reaction illuminates the Senate’s views regarding 
the scope of its commerce power over trade restraints. 
George explained in great detail why the bill would exceed Congress’s 
authority, invoking the Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence and 
categories employed to implement it.449 He correctly noted that the 
Court had defined commerce to “embrace purchase, sale, exchange, 
barter, transportation, and intercourse for the purpose of trade in all 
its forms.”450 “Regulation” was defined to entail “prescribing rules for 
carrying on that commerce; that is, regulating the doing of the things 
which of themselves constitute that commerce.”451 That power reached 
only “the very transactions between men which are commerce, interstate 
                                               
 442. See supra notes 435–37 and accompanying text. 
 443. See THORELLI, supra note 436, at 173. 
   444. See id. at 174. 
 445. See id. at 177. 
 446. See 21 CONG. REC. 1765 (1890) (reproducing S. 1, the then-current version of 
Senator Sherman’s bill reported by the Finance Committee). 
 447. Id. at 1765–71. Senator George had developed similar themes in the previous 
year. See 20 CONG. REC. 1459–62 (1889) (enumerating defects in the proposed bill and 
arguing that the bill itself was unconstitutional). 
 448. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 n.46 (1944). 
 449. See 21 CONG. REC. 1768–72 (1890) (reproducing Senator George’s floor speech, 
which argued—by reference to nineteenth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence—
that Sherman’s bill was unconstitutional). 
 450. Id. at 1768 (citing Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); County of 
Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 702 (1880)). 
 451. Id. 
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or foreign.”452 Transactions before or after interstate commerce, while 
“strictly commercial,” “are only domestic commerce in the State in which 
they take place, and are beyond the power of Congress to regulate.”453 
Thus, authority to regulate commercial activity was mutually exclusive 
between states and the national government. Congress had no power over 
“manufactures or any other kind of production,” which were not commerce, 
“nor sales, nor transportation,” which were commerce, “purely within a 
State.”454 
George next critiqued the bill’s three jurisdictional categories.455 
Focusing on articles which “shall be transported . . . from one State to 
another,” he correctly explained that Supreme Court decisions left 
production and agriculture within exclusive jurisdiction of individual 
states, even if producers intended to export the resulting products and 
thus engage in “commerce among the States.”456 While both decisions 
George cited entailed Commerce Clause challenges to state laws, he 
regarded each as definitive expositions of the affirmative scope of 
congressional power, thus treating state and federal authority over 
such activity as mutually exclusive.457 To be constitutional, he said, 
congressional “regulation must be of the act or the transaction of 
[interstate] commerce itself,” and not activity before or after such 
commerce.458 Nor did it matter if products competed “with dutiable 
goods.”459 If imposing tariffs on foreign manufacturers authorized 
Congress to ensure “free competition” between domestic firms, Congress 
                                               
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. at 1768–69 (“The methods of these operations of industry and art are 
exclusively for the States to regulate.”). Senator George also opined that states 
possessed exclusive power to punish “combinations and trusts within their respective 
limits.” See 20 CONG. REC. 1460 (1889) (“[T]here is a dividing line plainly marked by 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon one side of which rests 
the police power of the State, and on the other the commercial power of Congress.”). 
 455. Recall that the bill reached agreements governing: (1) imported articles, (2) 
articles competing with dutiable goods, and (3) those which “shall be transported for 
sale from one State or Territory to another.” S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888) (as amended 
Sept. 11, 1888); 21 CONG. REC. 1767, 1769–70 (1890). 
 456. 21 CONG. REC. 1767, 1769 (1890) (discussing Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886), 
and Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888)); see also id. at 1768–69 (invoking Veazie v. 
Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1852), and Lord v. S.S. Co., 102 U.S. 541 (1881)). 
 457. But see Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 
236, 238 (1948) (contending that Congress rejected dual federalism and mutual 
exclusivity). 
 458. 20 CONG. REC. 1460 (1889). 
 459. 21 CONG. REC. 1769–70 (1890). 
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could create authority over any industry by imposing duties on competing 
foreign products, exercising “unlimited” power.460 
Finally, George turned to concerted action reducing competition 
with respect to “transportation, or sale of articles imported into the 
United States.”461 The “plain meaning” of the bill banned restraints 
governing products imported into a state while no longer in their 
original packages and thus indistinguishable from other property in the 
state.462 Numerous decisions held that states had exclusive authority over 
such goods, and this provision therefore exceeded Congress’s power.463 
Less than a month after George’s speech, the Finance Committee 
introduced a new bill, with a different basis for the exercise of federal 
regulatory power.464 Explaining the bill, Sherman attributed the 
change to George’s opposition, as did at least one other Senator.465 
The new bill eliminated references to goods on which Congress had 
imposed duties and goods that “shall be transported . . . from one State 
or Territory to another.”466 Instead, invoking the diversity jurisdiction 
conferred by Article III of the Constitution, the bill banned arrangements 
between citizens of two or more states that tended to “prevent free and 
full competition” or “advance the cost to the consumer” with respect to: 
(1)  “importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into 
the United States”; 
(2)  “articles of growth, production, or manufacture of any State or 
Territory of the United States [competing] with similar articles of the 
growth, production, or manufacture of any other State”; or 
(3)  “transportation or sale” of articles produced, grown or manufactured 
in one State, “into or within any other State.”467 
Sherman then offered a lengthy defense of the policy and 
constitutionality of this new bill. Echoing the dual federalism informing 
                                               
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. at 1770. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. (discussing License Cases, 45 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), and Brown v. 
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827)). 
 464. See id. at 2455 (reproducing amended bill). 
 465. Id. at 2567 (stating that Senator Sherman revised the bill “to avoid somewhat the 
criticism of the Senator from Mississippi”); id. at 2463 (statement of Sen. Vest) (same). 
 466. See supra notes 455–60 and accompanying text (describing George’s critique of 
this language in previous bill). 
 467. See 21 CONG. REC. 2455 (1890); see also id. at 2456, 2460 (explaining that Article 
III jurisdiction “embraces the whole field of the common law and of commercial law” 
except between citizens of the same state, which the bill was not intended to target). 
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence,468 Sherman claimed that the new bill 
did not purport to govern “combinations within the limit of the State” 
but only reached those that “injuriously affect the interests of the United 
States.”469 In language sometimes quoted as a definitive exposition of the 
statute Congress ultimately enacted,470 Sherman opined as follows: 
The purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of the United States 
to apply the same remedies against combinations which injuriously 
affect the interests of the United States that have been applied in the 
several States to protect local interests . . . . If the combination is 
confined to a State[,] the State should apply the remedy; if it is 
interstate . . . Congress must apply the remedy.471 
Moreover, Sherman emphasized that the bill only applied where 
defendants were citizens of different states. Article III, he said, 
empowered Congress to regulate such contracts, just as Congress could 
provide rules of decision in diversity cases.472 Sherman also invoked the 
taxing and commerce power as providing authority to reach the 
conduct banned by the bill.473 
Despite Sherman’s rhetorical embrace of dual federalism, the new 
bill did not assuage Senator George.474 More importantly, other 
Senators now criticized the bill. Senator Vest of Missouri, for instance, 
emphasized that Supreme Court precedent granted only limited 
powers to Congress and that such limits were one of the Constitution’s 
chief virtues.475 He praised Senator George for an “admirable 
dissertation upon constitutional power” in explaining why Sherman’s 
original bill exceeded those limits.476 This latest bill exceeded those 
limits, by means of “an uncertain commingling of two elements utterly 
incongruous and utterly inconsistent.”477 Like George, he invoked 
                                               
 468. See supra note 173 and accompanying and immediately preceding text (describing 
this jurisprudence). 
 469. See 21 CONG. REC. 2456, 2460 (1890). 
 470. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 
375, 378–79 (1983); Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 450. 
 471. 21 CONG. REC. 2456–57 (1890). 
 472. Id. at 2460. 
 473. Id. at 2461. 
 474. Id. at 2560 (describing Senator Sherman’s most recent bill as “utterly without 
warrant in the Constitution”). 
 475. Id. at 2463 (“We live, very fortunately, in my judgment, under a written 
Constitution, and we are governed by the decisions of the Supreme Court in regard to 
the legislative powers vested in us.”). 
 476. See id. 
 477. Id. at 2464. 
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“three leading cases” defining the power to regulate interstate commerce 
as the power to govern “commerce in articles . . . after they have gone into 
commerce and are in transitu from one State to another.”478 
Echoing Senators George and Vest, Senator Hiscock from New York 
contended that Senators should “resist efforts in the direction of 
unwise, illegal, and unconstitutional legislation.”479 Invoking the Court’s 
dual federalism jurisprudence, including the mutual exclusivity of 
authority over trade restraints, he argued that the bill exceeded 
Congress’s power in various ways.480 With respect to imports, he said, 
the bill reached acts done both before importation, while the goods 
were outside the United States, but also after goods had “passed 
beyond the hands of the importer” and were subject (exclusively) to 
“State law” and “State taxation.”481 Thus, the bill purported to reach 
conduct exceeding Congress’s power “[a]t both ends” and “[did] not 
pretend to regulate interstate commerce.”482 
Senator Hiscock also warned of the “enormities” and the “far-reaching 
effect[s]” if the bill became law and if courts declared it constitutional.483 
The result, he said, would be “for Congress to take control of every 
producing interest in the respective States of the Union.”484 He 
expressed agreement with the Court’s jurisprudence, rejecting the 
view that the Constitution was defective because it lacked a provision 
empowering Congress to regulate contracts covered by the bill.485 The 
                                               
 478. Id. at 2465. Senator Vest was likely referring to Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 
(1888), Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886), and Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 
419 (1827). See supra note 456 and accompanying text (describing Senator George’s 
discussion of these cases); see also 21 CONG. REC. 2465 (1890) (asserting that 
congressional authority disappeared once goods left their original package and “went 
into the common mass of the property of the people of the State”); id. (endorsing 
Senator George’s argument “that we have no power under any clause of the Federal 
Constitution to legislate as to any article simply because it . . . may be at some time 
carried to another State”). 
 479. 21 CONG. REC. 2467 (1890). 
 480. Id. at 2468 (“[This] is not a jurisdiction that can be possessed by a State and 
the General Government at the same time.”). 
 481. Id. at 2467. 
 482. Id. (“At both ends it legislates with reference to commerce before the 
merchandise has been dispatched on its way to this country, and after it has reached 
here and after it has been taken out of the volume of commerce.”). 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. 
 485. Id. at 2468 (rejecting the argument “that the framers of the Constitution 
neglected to put something in the Constitution that . . . g[ave] Congress the proper 
authority in respect to this subject”). 
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Framers had adopted the Commerce Clause to empower the “General 
Government [to] prevent States from practically prohibiting commerce 
between each other, for the purpose of regulating taxation upon 
property which was to go from one State to another.”486 There was no 
reason, he said, to expand that power.487 Like Senator Vest, Hiscock 
rejected Sherman’s invocation of Article III’s diversity jurisdiction as a 
font of regulatory authority.488 His “fundamental” objections to the bill, 
he said, could “not be obviated by any amendments that possibly [could] 
be proposed.”489 
Senator Reagan of Texas also raised constitutional objections. 
Congress had a “limited power” “[o]n this subject,” and could not solve 
the trust problem unless “the several States t[ook] hold of the subject 
and ma[de] provisions there which [would have] cover[ed] the larger 
number and the greater amount of the wrongs complained of.”490 He 
endorsed criticisms leveled by Senators Vest and Hiscock but did not wish 
to occupy the Senate’s time repeating them. He opined that “[a] good 
deal of [the bill] . . . is not within the provisions of the Constitution.”491 
Senator Reagan urged Senators who agreed with this critique to vote 
for his own amendment, which took the form of a substitute bill.492 By 
its terms, the bill only applied to business “carried on with any foreign 
country, or between the States, or between any State and the District 
of Columbia.”493 The Senate, acting in the Committee of the Whole, 
adopted Reagan’s entire bill, adding the language to S. 1. After this 
and other amendments, the bill included sixteen sections, fourteen 
more than Sherman’s most recent bill.494 
On March 27, 1890, the Committee of the Whole reported the 
proposed version of S. 1 to the full Senate.495 Senator George Edmunds 
of Vermont, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, now addressed the 
                                               
 486. Id. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. at 2470; see also id. at 2469 (“State governments . . . have jurisdiction over 
the great mass of transactions out of which these troubles grow.”). 
 491. Id. at 2470. 
 492. Id. 
 493. Id. at 2469 (reproducing proposed amendment). 
 494. See THORELLI, supra note 436, at 194; supra notes 439–42 and accompanying 
text (describing the September 11 revision of the bill). 
 495. See 21 CONG. REC. 2723 (1890). 
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constitutional question at the urging of Senator George.496 Senator 
Edmunds opined that the authority of Congress relative to trusts was 
“narrow,” and that Congress had no power to supplant the exclusive 
“police regulations” of the states.497 He also declared that the Senate 
should resist pressure to pass legislation that exceeded Congress’s 
constitutional power, even if inaction left people at the mercy of “the 
most grinding and most stupendous of monopolies.”498 He reiterated 
Senator George’s embrace of dual federalism and mutual exclusivity of 
authority over commercial activity as well as the derivative conclusion 
that states had exclusive jurisdiction over production.499 He instanced 
the sugar trust as an example of an industry that, even if monopolized, 
was beyond the authority of Congress to abolish: 
[I]f every citizen of . . . Vermont . . . should implore me to pass an 
act of Congress to abolish the sugar trust, as the Legislature of the 
State of Vermont might do if it were established there, I should feel 
it my duty to them to say, “No, because I have not the power to do 
it[]” . . . .500 
Instead, Congress merely possessed the power “for impeding and 
harassing and cutting up the commercial transactions between the States 
of these great monopolies.”501 Congress, he said, should go “[j]ust as far 
as we can go in regulating the transition of property from State to State,” 
but should “[not] go any further.”502 Like Senator Hiscock, he also 
concurred as a matter of first principles with this allocation of power 
between sovereigns.503 
Senator Platt of Connecticut grudgingly agreed with George and 
others, concluding that no provision in S. 1 was constitutional. In a 
                                               
 496. Id. at 2727 (statement of Sen. George) (urging Senator Edmunds to “go into 
that matter fully”). 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. 
 499. See id. 
 500. Id. at 2728. 
 501. Id. 
 502. Id. at 2727–28 (endorsing ban on “the movement of the commodities of these 
great concerns and the arrangement of their transactions between the different 
States,” but noting “it is quite impossible for me to support [Senator Sherman’s bill]”). 
 503. Id. at 2727 (“[The Constitution] did not give to the Congress of the United 
States, and it did not mean to give, and it ought not to have given to it, and ought not to give 
to it now, I think, the power to enter into the police regulations of the people of the 
United States to endeavor to conduct or to manage or to regulate their affairs as the 
States, in every State of the Union, have been authorized—not authorized, but left by 
the Constitution in their original right to do.” (emphasis added)). 
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colloquy with Senator Hoar, Platt opined that “the particular contract . . . 
which might be reached under the [commerce power] must be 
exceedingly limited.”504 
These critiques apparently doomed Sherman’s bill. Shortly after 
Senator Platt’s remarks, Senator Walthall moved to refer the bill and 
various proposed amendments to the Judiciary Committee.505 While an 
identical motion had failed a few days earlier, Walthall’s motion narrowly 
passed.506 One scholar has attributed the Senate’s changed attitude to the 
remarks of Senator Edmunds regarding the constitutionality of 
Sherman’s latest proposal.507 
Instead of tinkering with the bill, the Committee, chaired by Senator 
Edmunds and including Senators George, Hoar, and Vest, proposed a 
brand new bill six days later that did not invoke the power to impose 
tariffs or the diversity jurisdiction as sources of regulatory authority.508 
Modern scholars agree that Edmunds drafted sections 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 
of the Act, except for seven words in section 1 drafted by Senator 
Evarts: “in the form of trust or otherwise.”509 A historian has quipped 
that the statute “known as the Sherman Antitrust Act” was more 
accurately called “the Edmunds Antitrust Act.”510 
The Senate considered the proposal on April 8, 1890. Edmunds 
reported that the Committee decided to: 
[F]rame a bill that should be clearly within our constitutional power, 
[and to] make its definition out of terms that were well known to the 
law already, and would leave it to the courts in the first instance to 
say how far they could carry it or its definitions as applicable to each 
particular case . . . .511 
                                               
 504. See id. at 2568. The only exception, Senator Hoar said, was when the 
“combination . . . affect[s] the price which is to be paid by the person who is to acquire 
[products] to be delivered to him in another State.” Id. 
 505. Id. at 2731. 
 506. Id. at 2610–11, 2731 (passing by a vote of thirty-one yeas to twenty-eight nays). 
 507. THORELLI, supra note 436, at 198–99. 
 508. S. 1, 51st Cong. (1890) (as amended Apr. 2, 1890); 21 CONG. REC 3145 (1890); 
THORELLI, supra note 436, at 199. 
 509. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT, 94 & n.9 (1954); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND 
POLITICS, 115 & n.59 (1988); THORELLI, supra note 436, at 212; Albert H. Walker, Who 
Wrote the Sherman Law?, 73 CENT. L.J. 257, 258 (1911). 
 510. See SKLAR, supra note 509, at 115. 
 511. 21 CONG. REC. 3148 (1890). 
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Sherman expressed his intention to vote for the bill, “not as being 
precisely what I want, but as the best under all the circumstances that 
the Senate is prepared to give.”512 However, on the same day, he opined 
that the measure would be “totally ineffective in dealing with 
combinations and Trusts.”513 
Senator George, by contrast, praised the new measure as the “best I 
think that can be framed under that particular power of Congress, the 
power over commerce, which the committee have attempted to frame 
a bill under.”514 There were, he said, “one or two powers of Congress . . . 
which the committee did not see proper to exercise,”515 presumably 
referring to the power to remove tariffs protecting trust-dominated 
industries.516 He also predicted that the public would be “great[ly] 
disappoint[ed]” because the bill “cover[ed] . . . a very narrow territory, 
leaving a very large number of these institutions, these trusts . . . without 
the purview of the bill.”517 This was “not the fault of the committee.”518 
Instead, in language the Supreme Court has quoted to support 
expansive applications of the Act, George offered that: “[t]he bill has been 
very ingeniously and properly drawn to cover every case which comes 
within what is called the commercial power of Congress.”519 He added, in 
language the Court omitted: “There is a great deal of this matter outside of 
that.”520 No one disputed George’s description of the bill’s scope. 
B.   The House 
Legislative history from one chamber of Congress cannot unilaterally 
determine a statute’s meaning. The Constitution mandates bicameralism 
and presentment, thereby requiring the interpreter to discern a meaning 
                                               
 512. Id. at 3145. 
 513. See Editorial, Mr. Sherman Gives up Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1890 at 4; see also 
LETWIN, supra note 509, at 94 (“The Judiciary Committee took the matter out of 
Sherman’s hands, much to his regret and anger.”). 
 514. 21 CONG. REC. 2901 (1890). 
 515. Id. 
 516. Id.; THORELLI, supra note 436, at 200 (concluding that Senator George had in 
mind “his old idea that the President be authorized to suspend the tariff on trust-
controlled goods”). 
 517. 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890). 
 518. Id. 
 519. Id.; see supra note 428 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s invocation 
of this sentence). 
 520. 21 CONG. REC. at 3147 (1890) (emphasis added); see United States v. Se. 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 n.46 (1944) (selectively quoting this statement). 
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to which both chambers agreed.521 Examination of the House’s 
deliberations confirms that that chamber embraced the same approach 
as the Senate. House proponents of the Senate bill did not question the 
Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence or suggest that the Sherman Act 
would expand whenever the Court devised a new standard governing 
the scope of the commerce power. 
The House of Representatives considered twelve trust-related bills 
during the 50th Congress, but none received a vote.522 The House 
referred the Senate bill to its own Judiciary Committee, which 
unanimously recommended adoption of the bill.523 Like numerous 
Senators, the Committee’s report embraced the Supreme Court’s dual 
federalism and mutual exclusivity of authority over trade restraints: 
“Congress has no authority to deal, generally, with the subject [of 
trusts] within the States, and the States have no authority to legislate 
in respect of commerce between the several States.”524 
The report did not suggest any departure from the Supreme Court’s 
pre-1890 allocation of authority over commercial activity.525 Instead, 
the report stated that the bill was “carefully confined to such subjects 
of legislation as are clearly within the legislative authority of Congress” 
and that “[n]o attempt [wa]s made to invade the legislative authority 
of the several States or even to occupy doubtful grounds.”526 The Supreme 
Court once candidly cited this report for the proposition that the 1890 
Congress “took a very narrow view of its power under the Commerce 
Clause.”527 
Presenting the report to the House, Congressman Culberson, a 
member of the Committee, opined that the “legislation occupies a new 
field” and that Congress’s power over “questions of this character,” is, 
with few exceptions, “extremely limited.”528 He also observed that “[t]here 
is no attempt to exercise any doubtful authority on this subject, but the 
                                               
 521. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
673, 718–19 (1997) (explaining how reliance on a committee report from a single 
house of Congress circumvents the requirements of bicameralism and presentment). 
 522. See 21 CONG. REC. 4100 (1890) (statement of Rep. Heard). 
 523. Id. 
 524. See H.R. REP. NO. 51–1707, at 1 (1890). 
 525. See supra Part I (describing these boundaries). 
 526. H.R. REP. NO. 51–1707, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 527. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976). The Court 
nonetheless went on to hold that the Sherman Act reached local anticompetitive 
conduct that produced no interstate harm because such conduct produced a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 744–47.  
 528. 21 CONG. REC. 4089 (1890). 
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bill is confined strictly and alone to subjects over which, confessedly, 
there is no question about the legislative power of Congress.”529 Both 
states and the Congress would have to exercise the powers they 
possessed in their respective mutually exclusive spheres. For Congress, 
this meant the power to “take charge of the trade between the States and 
[to] make unlawful traffic that operates in restraint of trade.”530 Echoing 
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, he opined that an 
interstate agreement between a manufacturer and dealers authorizing 
the latter to undersell rivals and drive them out of business was 
“directly in restraint of trade and commerce” and “secure[d] for the 
corporation a monopoly, in part, of interstate trade.”531 
Others emphasized similar themes. Congressman Ezra Taylor, the 
Committee’s chair, opined that the bill “goes as far . . . as Congress has 
the power to go under the Constitution,” and that states would have to 
supplement its provisions because Congress “can only deal with 
interstate transactions.”532 Congressman Elijah Morse of Massachusetts 
later agreed, stating that “Congress has no [power over] trusts within 
a State.”533 Instead, the “bill propose[d] to regulate transactions in 
restraint of trade between citizens of different States.”534 Congressman 
John Rogers concurred; he claimed to have read every bill introduced 
in both houses “upon the subject of trusts,” and concluded that the 
Senate bill was the only one that “could receive [the] sanction . . . of 
my oath.”535 Sherman’s bill, he said, “when brought under the scrutiny 
of the law, was completely eviscerated and destroyed.”536 The Senate bill 
was a “conservative measure . . . within the scope of the Constitution.”537 
Amendments to expand the bill’s coverage, he said, “would not hold 
water for a minute” if “brought to the test of adjudicated cases,” with 
which he expressed no disagreement.538 
* * * * * 
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In sum, nothing in the Act’s legislative history suggests that Congress 
disagreed with the Supreme Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence. 
Sherman’s own proposals would have reached some conduct that the 
Court’s jurisprudence assigned to the exclusive authority of the states.539 
However, both houses of Congress apparently rejected Sherman’s 
account of the scope of the commerce power and embraced a narrower 
version of the “Sherman Act” than Sherman proposed. According to 
Senator Edmunds, the author of section 1, the Act employed “terms 
that were well known to the law already,” i.e., terms of art, to describe 
the content and scope of the Act.540 Senator George, Senator Edmunds, 
and several others embraced case law that treated state and federal 
authority over commerce as mutually exclusive,541 as the Supreme 
Court would later hold in Addyston Pipe and E.C. Knight, for instance.542 
Indeed, Senator Edmunds endorsed the (future) result in E.C. Knight, 
opining that Congress lacked authority to regulate the sugar trust, 
despite its monopoly over the national sugar market.543 He also agreed 
with this allocation of authority.544 The House embraced the Senate 
language, and its Judiciary Committee report disclaimed any intent by 
Congress to exercise a “doubtful” authority but instead to reach those 
subjects “clearly within the . . . authority of Congress.”545 
No member of Congress suggested the Act would reach local 
conduct such as intrastate cartels. Even Sherman stated that states 
possessed exclusive authority over intrastate cartels and that the Act 
would only reach restraints that “injuriously affect the interests of the 
United States.”546 Nor did any member suggest the scope of the Act 
would expand if the Court revised the principle governing the scope of 
the commerce power. Some members of Congress expressly embraced 
the Court’s pre-1890 jurisprudence as a matter of first principles and 
thus presumably would have rejected the modern Court’s more 
expansive account of the commerce power. Far from purporting to 
exercise whatever power the Supreme Court might later create, 
                                               
 539. Cf. supra notes 449–54 and accompanying text (explaining George’s critique 
of Sherman’s proposals as exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce power). 
 540. See 21 CONG. REC. 3148 (1890); supra note 511 and accompanying text. 
 541. See supra notes 457, 497 and accompanying text. 
 542. See supra notes 273, 335–38 and accompanying text. 
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Congress chose merely to exercise that power the Court allowed in 
1890. Any claim that the 1890 Congress would have exercised the full 
scope of the modern commerce power, banning what Sherman 
himself called “combination[s] . . . confined to a [single] State” that 
produced no interstate harm, is sheer speculation, with no support in 
the legislative history.547 
VII.    IMPLICATIONS 
Recognition that the Supreme Court erred when it replaced the 
direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test does not 
thereby require the Court to return to the pre-1948 allocation of 
authority over antitrust matters. The doctrine of stare decisis generally 
has particularly strong claims in the statutory context, and, in that 
sense, may seem to require the Court to adhere to the substantial 
effects test.548 However, the Sherman Act is no ordinary statute where 
stare decisis is concerned. Instead, the Court has repeatedly held that 
a “competing interest . . . in recognizing and adapting to changed 
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience” weakens 
the doctrine in the antitrust context.549 Congress, the Court has said, 
expected the Court to “shape . . . the statute’s broad mandate by 
drawing on common-law tradition.”550 As explained earlier, the Rule of 
Reason itself contemplates that the Court will adjust Sherman Act 
doctrine over time in response to changed economic conceptions or 
conditions.551 
The rationale for a weakened version of stare decisis in the antitrust 
context implies its own limits, however. Antitrust decisions reversing 
prior holdings invariably invoke changed facts or economic theories, 
extrinsic to the Court itself and thus exogenous to the legal process.552 
The negative implication, and one consistent with the metaphor of 
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interpretive translation, is that the identification of mere legal error does 
not, even in the Sherman Act context, justify revision of prior decisions.553 
Thus, the outcome of any stare decisis analysis in this context may 
well depend upon how the Court understands its prior decisions 
expanding the Act to reach intrastate restraints that pose no interstate 
harm. If the Court attributes the 1948 change to a revised—though 
perhaps erroneous—legal understanding of the meaning of the Act, 
stare decisis may well be insurmountable. The Court could take a 
different approach, however, attributing the 1948 revision to changed 
economic circumstances—such as increased integration of the national 
economy and/or larger scale of enterprises—that purportedly 
undermine the rationale for exclusive state authority over local restraints 
that produce substantial effects on interstate commerce and justify 
national regulation.554 If the Court adopts this latter rationale for its 
rejection of the direct/indirect standard, stare decisis should yield to 
post-1948 developments in the theory of competitive federalism 
confirming that states possess appropriate incentives to generate 
impartial rules with respect to intrastate restraints producing substantial 
but indirect effects on interstate commerce.555 The result would be a 
return to the direct/indirect standard for allocating authority over trade 
restraints between states and the national government. 
Abandoning the substantial effects test and retracting the scope of 
the Sherman Act would reboot competitive federalism in the antitrust 
field. States would again be free to adopt unique antitrust doctrine 
applicable to restraints that occur within their borders and produce no 
external harm. States would reap the benefits of doctrinal innovations, 
with no prospect that federal courts applying the Sherman Act will 
undermine state-specific policies.556 The resulting competition between 
the states acting as “laboratories of democracy”557 would presumably 
generate a wider variety of possible solutions—both substantive and 
institutional—to various antitrust problems, as states vie for producers 
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and consumers by offering rival packages of antitrust doctrine and 
enforcement institutions.558 This decentralized process of articulating 
antitrust doctrine and policy would generate both experience and data 
about the impact of various rules and institutions, thereby informing 
lawmakers and state courts considering possible reforms. Federal courts, 
too, could learn from these results, drawing upon the “accumulated 
experience” of various states when fashioning Sherman Act doctrine.559 
Retraction of the scope of the Sherman Act would also radically alter 
the prominence and role of the state action doctrine, first articulated 
in 1943 in Parker v. Brown.560 As noted earlier, the vast majority of cases 
where parties raise the state action defense involve police power 
regulations restraining local commerce without producing any 
interstate harm.561 No doubt the resulting framing of the legal question 
as a clash between the Sherman Act and historic police power 
regulation has deterred the Court from invoking the Act as a source of 
general authority to evaluate the “reasonableness” of garden variety 
state regulations, especially during the 1940s, when faith in the motives 
and capacity of regulators was at its apogee.562 Indeed, scholars and 
jurists have attributed Parker to just such an anti-Lochnerian impulse.563 
Restoration of the pre-1948 direct/indirect standard would place such 
local regulations beyond the reach of the Sherman Act altogether, 
eliminating the need for any state action analysis with respect to such 
restraints.564 The Supreme Court’s state action docket would shrink 
accordingly. Moreover, state action cases that did reach the Court would 
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differ significantly from those that have thus far informed the Court’s 
treatment of state-imposed restraints. Instead of state regulations of 
local billboards, dentistry, and intrastate lawyer advertising, such cases 
would, like Parker, involve state restraints imposing substantial harm on 
out-of-state consumers.565 This new framing could force the current 
Court, less friendly to regulation than the Parker Court, to reconsider 
its hands-off approach to state-approved restraints. Reducing the scope 
of the Sherman Act could ironically result in more robust preemption 
of state-approved restraints than ever accomplished under the post-
1948 regime. 
Finally, the history recounted here would also alter the nature of the 
question posed. The Parker Court emphasized the absence of any 
indication that Congress anticipated preempting state-approved restraints 
of interstate commerce.566 However, the question that produced this 
answer was an anachronism. The Congress that enacted the Sherman Act 
would have assumed that state-approved direct restraints of interstate 
commerce would fall prey to the Court’s quasi-statutory regime of implied 
preemption.567 Today, of course, the Court refuses to interdict such 
restraints under what is now known as the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Thus, the real question for a court reconsidering the Sherman Act’s 
treatment of state-approved restraints is how Congress would have treated 
such restraints absent implied preemption, and this question could 
produce a quite different answer. 
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